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OUR FOUNDING FEELINGS: EMOTION,
COMMITMENT, AND IMAGINATION IN
CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE
Doni Gewirtzman *
I. INTRODUCTION
From the dawn of the American republic, constitutional law
and theory have treated emotion as destructive to the creation
and maintenance of constitutional commitments. If a constitu-
tion's purpose is to advance rule-of-law values like stability, con-
sistency, and predictability over time and across generations,l
emotion-viewed as an unstable, inconsistent, and unpredictable
force-threatens these values, thereby undermining the legitima-
cy and vitality of constitutional commitments and institutions.
Thus, the argument goes, emotion should have as little to do with
constitutional lawmaking and interpretation as possible. 2
This dominant account of the relationship between emotion
and constitutional law informed core features of American consti-
tutional design and practice. The framers saw rationality and
reason as essential elements of sound public decision making, and
* Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School. B.A., 1993, Weslyan Univ.; J.D.,
1998, Univ. of California-Berkeley Boalt Hall School of Law.
I am deeply thankful for the input I received from among others, Sam Bagenstos,
Mark Brandon, Rebecca Brown, Elizabeth Chambliss, Oscar Chase, Anne Coughlin, Peggy
Cooper Davis, Steve Ellmann, John Goldberg, Chris Guthrie, Helen Hershkoff, Rebecca
Hollander-Blumoff, Owen Jones, Terry Maroney, Nadine Strossen, Kenji Yoshino, and the
members of the New York Law School Junior Faculty Colloquium, and the editors at the
University of Richmond Law Review.
1. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738,
2831 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The Founders meant the Constitution as a practical
document that would transmit its basic values to future generations through principles
that remained workable over time."); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extra-
judicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARv. L. REV. 1359, 1372-81 (1997).
2. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Seeing the Emperor's Clothes: Recognizing the Reality of
Constitutional Decision Making, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1069, 1069-71 (2006) (describing the
"false allure of formalism" in constitutional judging, which claims that the judges' views,
ideologies, and experiences do not affect their decisions).
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selected deliberative decision-making structures that maximized
opportunities for legislators to explain and test their underlying
reasoning. For example, Article I's bicameralism and present-
ment requirements, which mandate that proposed legislation
gain approval from multiple decision makers representing vastly
different constituencies, 3 use the cold and slow realities of consti-
tutional procedure to slow the hot impulse of emotion. The
amendment process-a lengthy procedure that generally requires
assent from supermajorities of federal and state representa-
tives4-was also insulated from the whims of popular passion.
And judges, trained in legal methodologies that recognized the
primacy of reason and the need for consistency, came to be seen
as the sole and final arbiters of constitutional meaning.
This "Chinese wall" characterization of the relationship be-
tween emotion and constitutional law5 has had remarkable stay-
ing power. And under the influence of its spell, contemporary
constitutional scholarship contains only a very limited discussion
about how emotion actually works or impacts public decision
making.6 Unlike their counterparts in the criminal law arena, 7
3. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2-3, 7.
4. U.S. CONST. art. V.
5. See THE ECONOMIST, DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS 58 (Graham Bannock et al. eds.,
2003).
6. For examples of how constitutional scholars address social- and natural-science
research on emotions, see Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion: Im-
plications of Social Science Research on Emotion for Reading Casey, 83 WASH. L. REV. 1
(2008) (discussing emotional influence in informed-consent abortion laws); Chris Guthrie,
Carhart, Constitutional Rights, and the Psychology of Regret, 81 So. CAL. L. REV. 877
(2008); Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Common Sense as Constitutional Law, 62 VAND. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2009); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergen-
cies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605, 626-35 (2003) (exploring how fear impacts decision making in
an emergency context); Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Ex-
tremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 74-75 (2000) (investigating how social influences on behavior
and limited "argument pools" cause deliberative bodies to decide in accordance with their
members' "predeliberation tendencies"). Constitutional theorists are not alone in neglect-
ing how emotions actually work. See G.E. Marcus, Emotions in Politics, 3 ANN. REV. POL.
SCI. 221, 221 (2000) [hereinafter Marcus, Emotions in Politics] (referencing "the dominant
view in political theory that progress and democratic politics require less emotion and
more reason"). For large segments of the twentieth century, economics, psychology, and
political science were dominated by rational-actor, cognition-based explanations for hu-
man behavior. See JEROME BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING 1-4 (1990) (describing the "cogni-
tive revolution" in psychology); Donald R. Kinder, Reason and Emotion in Political Life, in
BELIEFS, REASONING, AND DECISION MAKING 277, 278 (Roger C. Schank & Ellen Langer
eds., 1994) (critiquing the lack of exploration of emotion in political science); George Loe-
wenstein & Jennifer S. Lerner, The Role of Effect in Decision Making, in HANDBOOK OF
AFFECTIVE SCIENCES 619, 619 (Richard J. Davidson et al. eds., 2003); George E. Marcus,
Emotions and Politics: Hot Cognitions and the Rediscovery of Passion, 30 SOC. SCI. INFO.
[Vol. 43:623
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constitutional theorists have for the most part been content to re-
ly on a set of broad generalizations about human behavior.8 As a
result, constitutional theory has largely ignored a voluminous
body of empirical and theoretical literature about emotion that
has accumulated over the past twenty years. 9 Meanwhile, social
scientists in a range of disciplines-social psychology, 10 neurobi-
ology,11 philosophy, 12 political science, 13 sociology,14 and econom-
ics15--have created a much richer and more nuanced account of
how emotion affects the way individuals interpret the world
around them, determines preferences and attitudes, and helps
make decisions. This new research threatens to turn long-held
assumptions about emotion and human behavior on their collec-
tive head.
This article explores the potential implications of this research
for constitutional law and theory. It concludes that emotion (1)
critically affects two behaviors that are central to the continued
legitimacy and survival of constitutional values and institutions:
commitment and imagination; (2) enhances individuals' ability to
maintain commitments over time by reinforcing habits, acting as
a stabilizing force for popular attitudes within a large and hete-
195, 196 (1991) [hereinafter Marcus, Emotions and Politics].
7. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63
U. CHI. L. REV. 361 (1996); Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of
Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1996); Terry A. Maroney, Emotional
Competence, "Rational Understanding," and the Criminal Defendant, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1375, 1375-76 (2006).
8. See RICHARD D. PARKER, "HERE, THE PEOPLE RULE": A CONSTITUTIONAL POPULIST
MANIFESTO 88-93 (1994).
9. See DANIEL GOLEMAN, EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE xi (1995) (describing "an unpa-
ralleled burst of scientific studies of emotion" in recent years).
10. See, e.g., DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS (2006); JONATHAN HAIDT,
THE HAPPINESS HYPOTHESIS: FINDING MODERN TRUTH IN ANCIENT WISDOM (2006).
11. See, e.g., ANTONIO D. DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE
HUMAN BRAIN (1994); JOSEPH LEDOUX, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN: THE MYSTERIOUS
UNDERPINNINGS OF EMOTIONAL LIFE (1996).
12. See, e.g., CHERYL HALL, THE TROUBLE WITH PASSION: POLITICAL THEORY BEYOND
THE REIGN OF REASON 11-20 (2005).
13. See, e.g., TED BRADER, CAMPAIGNING FOR HEARTS AND MINDS: HOW EMOTIONAL
APPEALS IN POLITICAL ADS WORK (2006); GEORGE E. MARCUS, THE SENTIMENTAL CITIZEN:
EMOTION IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS (2002); DREW WESTEN, THE POLITICAL BRAIN: THE
ROLE OF EMOTION IN DECIDING THE FATE OF THE NATION (2007).
14. See, e.g., PASSIONATE POLITICS: EMOTIONS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (Jeff Goodwin
et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter PASSIONATE POLITICS].
15. See, e.g., ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF
THE EMOTIONS (1988); Jennifer S. Lerner et al., Heart Strings and Purse Strings: Carryov-
er Effects of Emotions on Economic Decisions, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 337 (2004).
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rogeneous polity, and helping individuals interpret and prioritize
constitutional commitments; and (3) makes imagination possible,
allowing constitutional communities to reassess and revise prior
commitments.
Each conclusion runs contrary to standard accounts of emotion
as a destabilizing and destructive force in constitutional law. This
article is an effort to rectify that situation and to create a closer
link between constitutional theory and the social practice of con-
stitutionalism.
In turn, these social practices can potentially alter a range of
ongoing debates within constitutional theory. An enhanced rec-
ognition of emotion's positive impact on constitutional culture
calls into question the Supreme Court of the United States' status
as the final arbiter of constitutional meaning, certain assump-
tions about the Court's ability to impact public opinion, the ap-
propriate standards for constitutional amendment, and the de-
sign of democratic institutions.
Part II of this article argues that the Constitution's drafters
subscribed to a theory of human behavior that is embedded
throughout American constitutional structure and practice. The
theory consisted of two widely accepted propositions that still en-
joy widespread acceptance in contemporary constitutional cul-
ture: (1) a rigid dualism that sets reason and emotion in irrecon-
cilable opposition to one another and (2) a strong preference for
rational, deliberate decision making over making choices based
on feelings or intuition. This theory guided core aspects of consti-
tutional design and has been perpetuated by subsequent genera-
tions of constitutional judges, lawyers, and scholars.
Parts III and IV challenge the notion that emotion represents a
threat to the constitutional order. Part III uses research in the
social and natural sciences to argue that emotion helps individu-
als keep and maintain commitments. This, in turn, enables a
large and heterogeneous polity to operate in stable and predicta-
ble ways, and allows constitutional commitments to transcend
generational and demographic shifts. Moreover, emotion helps
structure the process of interpreting existing commitments and
integrally contributes to the exercise of rational thought. Part IV
argues that emotion enables the imagination to conceive of new
commitments, and therefore is essential to the process of consti-
tutional revision and renewal. In particular, emotion informs per-
[Vol. 43:623
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ceptions of existing commitments, enables people to assess ra-
tionally their continued value, and facilitates action to change
those commitments when necessary.
Finally, Part V spells out some preliminary ideas about how
emotion research might advance current descriptive and norma-
tive debates in constitutional theory.
Given the wide scope of recent emotion research and its many
potential implications, there are two limitations on the scope of
this article. First, it does not directly address the growing body of
literature on judicial behavior.16 While much of the work on emo-
tion and decision making has potential implications for how
judges interpret the Constitution, judicial actors are not the focus
of this piece. Rather, it primarily focuses on how citizens develop
their own interpretations of constitutional meaning, because pop-
ular conceptions of constitutional law-in the form of public opi-
nion-often act as a constraint on the Court's power.17 Constitu-
tional meaning stems from a cultural interplay between law and
politics, and it is impossible to understand fully doctrinal devel-
opment by focusing exclusively on the actions of federal judges. If,
as many political scientists and constitutional scholars have con-
cluded, the Supreme Court operates within constraints estab-
lished by dominant electoral majorities,18 the forces that govern
individuals' political perceptions and behavior are a powerful and
highly relevant dynamic in contemporary constitutional lawmak-
ing.
Second, the relationship between law and emotion works in
both directions. As emotion shapes the content and interpretation
of legal commitments, the law also shapes emotional responses in
16. See generally Richard A. Posner, How JUDGES THINK (2008); Chris Guthrie, Jeff-
rey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrick, Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases,
93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007); Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information?" The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding,
153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (2005).
17. See Thomas M. Keck, Party Politics or Judicial Independence? The Regime Politics
Literature Hits the Law Schools, 32 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 511, 528-32 (2007) (summarizing
recent legal literature supporting the link between public opinion and the Court's decision
making).
18. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revo-
lution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1050 (2001) (addressing the effect of the Republican party's
entrenchment on the Court's decision regarding the 2000 presidential election); Robert A.
Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6
J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957).
20091
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
both legal and non-legal contexts. By defining the spheres of pub-
lic and private conduct, the appropriate uses of the state's coer-
cive power, and the areas of individual autonomy, constitutional
law cultivates and manipulates emotional response. While this
topic deserves further exploration, it is beyond the limited scope
of this article.
A Note About the Definition of Emotion
"Emotion" is a contested term, with scholars in a range of dis-
ciplines engaged in active disagreement over its definition.19
They disagree not only about the dividing line between emotion
and cognition, but also over the definition of different emotions. 20
Complicating matters, these definitions may be culturally contin-
gent-different societies may answer the question "what is an
emotion" or identify appropriate emotional responses in different
ways. 21 Americans, for example, are more optimistic than other
cultures and tend to associate positive feelings with a compara-
tively wider range of events. 22
This article adopts the following definition, which reflects a de-
veloping consensus within the field: Emotions (1) are triggered by
a particular stimulus that bears a relationship to an individual or
collective goal; (2) involve a set of physiological changes (both
conscious and unconscious); (3) provoke some change in cognitive
activity by focusing attention, bringing particular memories into
conscious awareness, or activating other thought processes; and
(4) are tied to an action tendency to behave in a particular way. 23
For example, fear is generally triggered by a threat to the goal of
survival, causes a set of physiological changes such as increased
heart rate and perspiration, focuses conscious attention imme-
diately on the threat, and creates the action tendencies to flee
and seek safety. 24
19. See KEITH OATLEY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING EMOTIONS 28 (2d ed. 2006).
20. See Hazel Rose Markus & Shinobu Kitayama, The Cultural Construction of Self
and Emotion: Implications for Social Behavior, in EMOTION AND CULTURE (Shinobu Ki-
tayama and Hazel Rose Markus eds., 1994).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 104.
23. BRADER, supra note 13, at 51.
24. See id.
[Vol. 43:623
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One critical element causes major concern about emotion's im-
pact on decision-making capacity: emotions often operate as in-
tuitions that exist outside the realm of conscious thought.25 For
example, people often sense danger before its source enters their
full awareness, and their bodies begin preparing to respond to
that danger even before they fully comprehend it.26 Much of the
discussion that follows focuses on the intuitive aspect of emotion
and the ways in which reliance on affective intuition helps to
maintain stability within a constitutional community.
II. COMMITMENT, IMAGINATION, AND THE DOMINANT VIEW
In April 2005, Harvard constitutional scholar Laurence Tribe
sent a letter to Associate Supreme Court Justice Stephen Brey-
er. 27 In the letter, Tribe announced that he was suspending work
on the third edition of his acclaimed constitutional law treatise
due to confusion over the status of "basic constitutional premis-
es."28 In a separate note to readers, he asserted that "the very
working materials of American constitutional law may be in the
process of changing"29 and called for "systemic attention" to "pop-
ular conceptions of constitutional law" that shape legal develop-
ment and governmental behavior.30 Specifically, Tribe hig-
hlighted the interpretive challenges posed by the "extraordinary
politics of feeling" that surround contemporary constitutional dis-
course, and the tension between "the encompassing rhetoric of
searing emotion" and long-standing constitutional principles. 31
25. This subconscious element is not unique to emotion. Indeed, a long-established
body of scholarship has examined the role of cognitive heuristics (or mental shortcuts) and
their ability to distort decision making in predictable ways. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Da-
niel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); Cass
R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics, 28 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 531 (2005).
26. See Robert S. Adler, Flawed Thinking: Addressing Decision Biases in Negotiation,
230 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 683, 694-96 (2005) (discussing the benefits of heuristics,
particularly in survival situations).
27. Letter from Laurence H. Tribe, Carl M. Loeb Univ. Professor, Harvard Univ., to
Stephen G. Breyer, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States (Apr. 29, 2005), in
Laurence H. Tribe, The Treatise Power, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 291, 292-93 (2005).
28. Id. at 292.
29. Letter from Laurence H. Tribe, Carl M. Loeb Univ. Professor, Harvard Univ., to
Interested Readers of American Constitutional Law (Apr. 29, 2005), in Laurence H. Tribe,
The Treatise Power, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 294, 297 (2005).
30. Id. at 299.
31. Id.
2009]
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Tribe's focus on the social practice of constitutionalism outside
the courts and the relationship between constitutional law and
emotion is well-placed. It was, after all, a series of collective emo-
tional outbursts in the form of violent social upheavals that re-
sulted in the establishment and maintenance of our most sacred
constitutional commitments. 32 Constitutions are written and
changed in moments of extreme popular passion: revolution, civil
war, and severe economic hardship are indispensable elements of
American constitutional development. 33
Moreover, as any regular viewer of the nightly news or social
historian can attest, constitutional interpretation is inseparable
from a political culture that is bathed in emotion. 34 The Constitu-
tion serves as a focal point for individual and collective expres-
sions of hope and fear, love and hate, and sympathy and dis-
gust.35  Constitutional history and doctrine contain many
remnants of dreams realized, deferred, and denied, along with the
expired emotions that set those alternative visions of constitu-
tional meaning into action. 36
Furthermore, like any religion, constitutional law sustains and
legitimizes itself through emotional ties created by, facilitated by,
and focused upon ritual, symbol, a foundational myth, and a core
text.37 In this light, "constitutional culture"38 often transcends
the legalistic and the logical, with emotion functioning as an es-
sential predicate for the American constitutional regime and a
vehicle for collective expression of social aspirations.
32. See JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-
GOVERNMENT 129 (2001); see also Frederick Schauer, The Constitution of Fear, in
CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 84, 84-88 (William N. Es-
kridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998) (arguing that excessive fear contributed to
flawed aspects of constitutional design).
33. See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 3-8 (1998).
34. See BRADER, supra note 13, at 183 (discussing findings that provide "strong sup-
port to the common belief that politicians routinely use ads to appeal to emotions").
35. See DAVID I. KERTZER, RITUAL, POLITICS, AND POWER 64-65 (1988); see also Robert
C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution:
Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 36-37 (2003).
36. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 40-42 (1983) (describing a "jurisgenerative" process where
multiple constitutional norms are asserted by different interpretive communities, and the
"jurispathic" role played by the Court in choosing between different interpretive visions).
37. See KERTZER, supra note 35, at 60-65, 133.
38. See Post, supra note 35, at 8 (defining constitutional culture as a "specific subset
of culture that encompasses extrajudicial beliefs about the substance of the Constitution").
[Vol. 43:623
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The Constitution also defines the broad parameters by which
law and emotion intersect and recognize one another within pub-
lic life. When Chief Justice John Roberts likened his role as a
constitutional interpreter to an umpire calling balls and strikes
at his confirmation hearing, 39 or when Justice Ruth Ginsberg, for
the first time in her fifteen-year tenure on the Supreme Court,
decided to read two "passionate and pointed" dissents aloud from
the bench,40 they both made statements about the relationship
between emotion and constitutional lawmaking.41 Disputes about
prayer at graduation ceremonies or football games address the
level of comfort with the emotions that are generated, released,
and suppressed by particular types of public ritual.42 Cases about
same-sex marriage, grandparent visitation, or sodomy laws ques-
tion whether the law will recognize particular types of love in
human relationships. 43 In addition, as the Court's recent ruling
in Gonzales v. Carhart suggests, a woman's ability to terminate a
pregnancy in a particular way may hinge on perceptions about
the lasting emotional impact of late-term abortions. 44
Yet in spite of these cultural realities, the definition of consti-
tutional commitments is still commonly seen as a process domi-
nated by rationality, where interpretive rules and institutional
constraints act to minimize emotion's taint on constitutional
meaning.45 This account-dominant within the legal community
and closely linked to the need for judicial supremacy-suggests
that emotion should have as little to do with constitutional cul-
ture as possible. 46
39. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr., To Be Chief
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55
(2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.).
40. Linda Greenhouse, Oral Dissents Give Ginsberg a New Voice, N.Y. TIMES, May 31,
2007, at Al.
41. See Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court, 2007 Term-Foreword: Demosprudence
Through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4, 27 (2008) (discussing the practice of "oral dissents"
as a way for judges to engage an audience on an "emotional level").
42. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294, 307-08 (2000); Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580, 592-93 (1992).
43. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60
(2000); Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003).
44. 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1634 (2007).
45. See SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:
THE BASIC QUESTIONS 13 (2007).
46. See Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 1078-79 (discussing how judges' views and ide-
ologies may overshadow issues of textual interpretation, framers' intent, and cost-benefit
analysis).
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This part makes three arguments. First, it argues that consti-
tutions provide a structure for two social phenomena that are
central to human existence: commitment and imagination.
Second, it links emotion, commitment, and imagination by ar-
guing that constitutional culture has long viewed emotion as de-
structive to both phenomena. Third, it examines how beliefs
about emotion influenced core aspects of American constitutional
design, including the procedures for making and altering consti-
tutional commitments.
A. Commitment and Imagination in Constitutional Systems
The primary function of written constitutions is to facilitate
collective commitments that transcend time and the day-to-day
battles of conventional politics. 47 As many theorists have noted,
constitutions establish precommitments: constraints on future
behavior put into effect at Time 1 to ensure that action taken at
some point in the future-Time 2-will conform with the course
of action preferred at Time 1.48 Thus, a community makes a pre-
47. See RUBENFELD, supra note 32, at 93 ("Written constitutionalism is properly un-
derstood as a nation's struggle to lay down and live out its own fundamental political
commitments over time.").
48. Id. at 116-17. For the past fifteen years or so, precommitment has been a budding,
if not central, preoccupation for constitutional theorists. There are at least three reasons
for the recent level of interest: originalism, the rise of the Rehnquist Court, and the de-
mise of the former Soviet Union.
First, originalism-defining constitutional meaning as defined by the intent and motives
of those who drafted the relevant constitutional provision-focuses on the virtues of pre-
commitment. See id. at 62. Originalism revolves around the ideas that commitments are
fixed at a particular point in the past and that constitutional interpreters can only locate
the limits of present-day or future constraints by defining the precise understanding of a
constitutional commitment at the moment it was made. See id. at 88, 185. As Justice Sca-
lia, Judge Bork, and others began to provide credibility and intellectual firepower for ori-
ginalism as an interpretive model in contemporary constitutional lawmaking, justifica-
tions for, and critiques of, precommitment seeped into the debate over its original
meaning. See id. at 64-65.
Second, progressive scholars began to experience widespread frustration over the
Court's shift to the right. The result has been a spate of recent theories about the mechan-
ics of constitutional change, relying on interdisciplinary work in history, political science,
and sociology, with the partial goal of legitimizing interpretive activity that occurs outside
the judiciary. See id. at 73. Several progressive scholars have refrained constitutional go-
vernance as a form of popular sovereignty, endorsing the ability of "the People" to stake
independent claims about constitutional meaning outside of Article V. See id. at 70-71.
This too required engagement with precommitment, but focused on determining how pre-
commitments are negotiated and redefining the parties involved in that negotiation
process.
Third, the end of the Cold War led to a new round of constitution drafting in the past fif-
teen years, particularly as new republics formed out of the former Soviet Union. Evgeni
[Vol. 43:623
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commitment at Time 1 knowing that the precommitment (a) will
restrict its ability to act at Time 2 and (b) may indeed preclude a
course of action that the community, for good or bad reasons,
wants to engage in at Time 2.49
Constitutional provisions, by operating as supreme law and re-
quiring a higher threshold for adoption and amendment than or-
dinary statutes,50 act as the primary legal device for establishing
and enforcing shared legal precommitments. Constitutional pre-
commitments can take a range of forms: processes for collective
decision making, institutional behaviors and limitations that em-
body a particular set of values, and mechanisms for defining new
precommitments or altering existing ones.51
Why would a society willingly restrict its ability to engage in a
particular desired action at an unknown point in the future?
Commitments, in legal and less formal incarnations, benefit so-
ciety because they promote consistency. Social psychologists have
long noted that a desire for consistency is a central motivator for
human behavior, in part due to its ability to promote stable, pre-
dictable decision making and consequences.52 This, in turn, pro-
motes efficient decision making-individuals and institutions can
make choices and take risks with reduced information-gathering
costs, an enhanced ability to predict outcomes, an ability to trust
and predict the actions of others, and a sense of confidence that
comes from day-to-day continuity. 53 Consistency also allows com-
plex systems and large numbers of people to coordinate behavior,
which facilitates the success of shared endeavors and the
achievement of common goals.54
Tanchev, Historical and Psychological Sources Shaping Constitutionalism and Constitu-
tional Performance in the Post-Communist Societies, in LEGAL REFORM IN POST-
COMMUNIST EUROPE 141, 143 (Stanislaw Frankowski & Paul B. Stephen, III eds., 1995).
With the terms of precommitments being hashed out by a new generation of constitutional
framers, there was a new market for lessons learned from past attempts to design pre-
commitment procedures.
49. See RUBENFELD, supra note 32, at 116-17.
50. JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND
CONSTRAINTS 101 (2000). There are a range of devices that constitutions use to establish
this higher threshold, such as requiring supermajorities, creating delays, or imposing ad-
ditional costs. Id.
51. See id. at 88-92.
52. ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 54 (4th ed. 2001).
53. See id. at 61-68.
54. See id. at 95-96.
2009]
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Commitment strategies are among the best available vehicles
to promote consistency; 55 if someone makes a commitment, it
creates "personal and interpersonal pressures to behave consis-
tently with that commitment."56 Externally, consistency is consi-
dered an attractive social trait-human beings want other people
to like them and therefore want to be perceived as consistent by
others.57 Internally, consistency offers individuals an efficient
shortcut through the time and agony it takes to make difficult de-
cisions.58
Hence, continuity and stability are among the primary benefits
associated with a written constitution. Public commitments-
particularly those made in writing-harness these internal and
external pressures and serve as the most effective mechanisms to
ensure consistent behavior over time. 59 Constitutions capitalize
on these social realities, using written commitments-backed by
fidelity to law-to promote consistent behavior.
The consistency embedded in constitutional commitments is in
perpetual tension with another activity that is central to both
human existence and constitutional culture: imagination. Consti-
tutions provide a structure for imagining and negotiating collec-
tive aspirations for the future. The text provides a set of substan-
tive dreams for a better world, 60 and the process of constitutional
lawmaking-both within and outside the courts-provides a
structure for a cultural conversation in which citizens, as partici-
pants in a constitutional culture, envision, negotiate, and fight for
a better world in the years and decades to come. 61 Moreover, by
its very terms, the Federal Constitution remains an unfinished
55. Id. at 61.
56. Id. at 53 (emphasis omitted).
57. See id. at 54 (showing that inconsistency is perceived as an "undesirable social
trait" (citing A.R. Allgeier et al., The Waffle Phenomenon: Negative Evaluations of Those
Who Shift Attitudinally, 9 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 170, 179 (1979)); S.E. Asch, Forming
Impressions of Personality, 41 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 258, 273-75 (1946)).
58. Id. at 55.
59. See id. at 68-70.
60. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 433 (1986) (describing the Constitution as "em-
bod[ying] the aspiration to social justice, brotherhood, and human dignity that brought
this nation into being" and "the lodestar for our aspirations").
61. See Post, supra note 35, at 8.
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document. By setting out an amendment procedure, Article V re-
cognizes the text's imperfections and the need for continued inno-
vation.62
Imagination about the future is, thus, essential to a constitu-
tional system. When individuals try to amend the Constitution or
interpret its meaning, the future-even from a short-term pers-
pective-is never far from their minds. This is true even in doc-
trinal areas, such as substantive due process, which demand a
look backward in time to examine the past for evidence of the na-
tion's history and tradition.63 Even there, the interpretive frame
constructs an imagined vision of the future that provides cultural
continuity through a close link with the past.
In constitutional development, commitment and imagination
are both mutually dependent and in irreconcilable tension. Im-
agination forms visions of a lasting future that inspire constitu-
tional commitments into being; commitments provide stimuli for
constitutional imagination, because change so often results from
dissatisfaction with present commitments and the dim prospects
of a stagnant future. Conversely, commitments stifle imagination
by creating procedural and substantive roadblocks to realizing
imagined alternatives: Imagination constrains commitment by
counseling against creating restrictions today that might inhibit a
better tomorrow. In part, this paradoxical relationship is attri-
butable to the different temporal perspectives embedded in each
behavior-commitment looks to the past, while imagination looks
to the future.
B. The Dominant View: Dualism and Rationality-Preferencing
Our constitutional system reflects a dominant theory of human
behavior that views emotion as destructive to the maintenance of
existing constitutional commitments and to the process of imagin-
ing new ones. 64 This view contains two core elements.
First, it relies upon a rigid dualism that sets reason, cognition,
deliberation, mind, and thought in irreconcilable opposition
against emotion, affect, intuition, heart, and feeling. Second, it
62. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 12-13 (2005).
63. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 723 (1997).
64. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
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subscribes to rationality-preferencing-the notion that within
this dualistic framework, decisions based on reason and delibera-
tion are better than decisions made under the influence of emo-
tion and intuition.65
This adverse relationship between constitutional law and emo-
tion flows directly from a view of human behavior that treats
emotion as corrosive to public decision making and to the collec-
tive search for a common good.66 From the perspective of com-
mitment and imagination, emotion causes a society to make un-
wise commitments based on short-term desires, discard existing
commitments made during a period of calmer and rational think-
ing, and imagine new commitments that are destructive to other
constitutional values.
As a result, constitutional commitments are often designed as
safeguards against emotion's potential to distort decision making
by constitutional actors.67 As George Marcus and his co-authors
describe it, critics have derided emotion's influence on decision
making in four different ways. First, emotion displaces reason
through overstimulation, which makes careful deliberative con-
sideration of rational alternatives impossible. 68 Second, emotion
distracts by drawing individuals' attention to irrelevant consider-
ations and distorting their ability to assess risk and relative bene-
fits.69 Third, emotion leads to intransigence by creating an inten-
sity of belief that is immune to new information or persuasion. 70
Finally, emotion facilitates self-absorption, making it impossible
to consider larger consequences or public goals. 71
65. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
66. See ROBERT C. SOLOMON, A PASSION FOR JUSTICE: EMOTIONS AND THE ORIGINS OF
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 55 (1990) ("In many versions of [social contract] theory, justice be-
comes a matter of reason whose purpose is to counter and control the unruly and usually
selfish dictates of our natural passions.").
67. See STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY 272 (1995), PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 8 (1999).
68. GEORGE E. MARCUS ET AL., AFFECTIVE INTELLIGENCE AND POLITICAL JUDGMENT
18-19 (2000).
69. Id. at 19.
70. Id. at 19-20.
71. Id. at 20-21. For a somewhat different laundry list of the ways in which emotion
potentially undermines cognition and sound judgment, see ELSTER, supra note 50, at 87;
HALL, supra note 12, at 13.
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Taken as a whole, the dominant view treats emotion in public
life as a threat to stability and a vehicle for injustice, intolerance,
violence, and political instability. 72 This view of human behavior
influenced the development of constitutional institutions and pro-
cedures at the time of the nation's founding, and found wide-
spread reinforcement from theorists, judges, and legal academics
throughout the two centuries that followed.
1. Dualism and Rationality-Preferencing at the Founding
The dominant view's rigid dualism was prominent in the minds
of those drafting and marketing the new American Constitu-
tion. 73 It drew on a long and distinguished intellectual tradition
within Western political and philosophical development 74 that
separated "reason from passion, thinking from feeling, [and] cog-
nition from emotion."75 In The Federalist Papers, Publius envi-
sioned "passions" as diametrically opposed to reason.76 He patho-
logized the "sudden breese of passion"77  as "angry,"78
"malignant,"79 "transient,"80 "irregular," and subject to the "artful
misrepresentation of interested men."81 Passion threatened to
"drown" . . . the mild voice of reason,"8 2 resulting in constitutional
governance dominated by "[a]mbition, avarice, personal animosi-
ty, [and] party opposition."8 3
Within this dualistic framework, the framers weighed in solidly
on the reason/deliberation side of the battle,84 in line with a long-
72. See Hall, supra note 12, at 24-25.
73. See RUBENFELD, supra note 32, at 116 n.26 ("The reason/passion trope is a strong
theme in the Federalist Papers.").
74. See HOLMES, supra note 67, at 45; THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 121 (Allan Bloom
trans., Basic Books 2d ed. 1991); Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Does Mood Influence Moral
Judgment? An Empirical Test with Legal and Policy Implications, 29 L. & PSYCHOL. REV.
1, 1-2 & n.4 (2005); Martha C. Nussbaum, The Supreme Court, 2006 Term-Foreword:
Constitutions and Capabilities: "Perception" Against Lofty Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REV.
4, 32 n.78 (2007).
75. LEDOUX, supra note 11, at 24.
76. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 343 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
77. THE FEDERALIST NO. 71, at 482 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
78. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 5 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
79. Id.
80. THE FEDERALIST NO. 71, supra note 77, at 482.
81. THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, at 425 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
82. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 283 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
83. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 5 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob B. Cooke ed., 1961).
84. See HOLMES, supra note 67, at 269; George E. Marcus, The Psychology of Emotion
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held perception that "passions are a negative force in human be-
havior."85 In part, this reflected Enlightenment beliefs that rea-
son was critical to human progress86 and that emotion was in-
compatible with liberal democracies because it serves "as the
basis for intemperateness, ethnocentrism, swift and intractable
prejudices, and thoughtlessness."87
Throughout The Federalist Papers, Publius described reason as
superior to emotion, deliberation as superior to intuition, and
both emotion and intuition as inconsistent with the common "rule
of law" values: consistency, predictability, and stability.S8 In Fe-
deralist No. 49, James Madison set forth his theory that reason is
essential to the constitutional order about as clearly as one could
imagine: "it is the reason, alone, of the public, that ought to con-
trol and regulate the government. The passions ought to be con-
trolled and regulated by the government."89 Publius saw passion
as intimately connected to factionalism and initiating the irra-
tional desire to form groups that were forever locked in constant
battle with other groups.90 As Madison noted, "In all very numer-
ous assemblies, of whatever characters composed, passion never
fails to wrest the scepter from reason. Had every Athenian citizen
been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a
mob."91
As Paul Kahn put it, the Federalist mission was "to bring
science to popular government."92 Reflection and deliberation
were deemed essential to good public decision making,93 and rea-
and Politics, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 182, 185 (David 0. Sears et
al. eds., 2003).
85. Loewenstein & Lerner, supra note 6, at 619.
86. See Suzanna Sherry, The Sleep of Reason, 84 GEO. L.J. 453, 466 (1996).
87. Marcus, Emotions and Politics, supra note 6, at 198.
88. See RICHARD K. MATTHEWS, IF MEN WERE ANGELS: JAMES MADISON AND THE
HEARTLESS EMPIRE OF REASON 81 (1995) (noting that Madison makes no positive refer-
ence to "passion" in the Federalist Papers); Neil S. Siegel, A Theory in Search of a Court,
and Itself Judicial Minimalism at the Supreme Court Bar, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1951, 2015
(2005) (identifying rule-of-law values).
89. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, supra note 76, at 343.
90. See HOLMES, supra note 67, at 268.
91. THE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 340 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
92. PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY: SELF-GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 12 (1992); see JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS
AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 152-53 (1996).
93. THE FEDERALIST No. 71, supra note 77, at 431 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961).
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son enabled social choices to align with the public good.94 In
Hannah Arendt's words, the founders saw "government in the
image of individual reason" and "the rule of government over the
governed according to the age-old model of the rule of reason over
the passions."95 As Alexander Hamilton noted in Federalist No.
15, government is necessary because "the passions of men will not
conform to the dictates of reason and justice without con-
straint."96 Passions were seen as erratic, creating a "turbulent
and changing" populace unable to "judge or determine right."97
To a large extent, the concern over the corrosive impact of emo-
tion on decision making reflected the immediate challenges of
managing a volatile post-revolutionary environment, where
shared emotional bonds formed in the heat of battle against a
common British enemy were disintegrating.9 8 Moreover, the fra-
mers' concerns about emotion reflected the tumult that sur-
rounded post-founding American politics. 99 Legislative turnover
was high, major ideological schisms existed about fundamental
issues of economic and foreign policy, and a vibrant press stoked
public emotion and agitation.100 Political violence in eighteenth-
century America was far more commonplace than it is today, and
public participation in political life was marked by "mobbing,"
strong rhetoric, and other acts that involved highly visible emo-
tional displays. 101
Publius's rhetoric around emotion was not particularly
nuanced and grouped a wide range of very strong and different
emotions under the umbrella of "passions."102 The subtlety with
which people describe different emotions today did not appear in
94. See KAHN, supra note 92, at 15. But see MARCUS, supra note 13, at 27-28 (offering
evidence of a more ambivalent attitude towards reason in The Federalist Papers).
95. HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 91 (1963).
96. THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 96 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
97. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 299 (Max Farrand ed.,
1966) [hereinafter 1 RECORDS].
98. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, supra note 76, at 341 (ed.,) (1961).
99. See Jan Lewis, "Those Scenes for Which Alone My Heart Was Made'" Affection and
Politics in the Age of Jefferson and Hamilton, in AN EMOTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 52, 54 (Peter N. Stearns & Jan Lewis eds., 1998).
100. See id.
101. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 156 (2004).
102. See SUSAN JAMES, PASSION AND ACTION: THE EMOTIONS IN SEVENTEENTH-
CENTURY PHILOSOPHY 4-5 (1997).
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his writings; he treated happiness and sadness, empathy and dis-
gust, and anger and elation as one and the same. 103
Despite this broad-brush perspective, the framers recognized
some useful purposes for emotion in creating a constitutional re-
gime. Specifically, they saw emotion as important for establishing
the new Constitution's legitimacy and for developing a sense of
national identity.104 As historian Jan Lewis noted, "[T]he found-
ers of the new national government knew that one of their great-
est challenges was to stimulate affection for the new national
government."105 Madison derided those who felt that "the people
of America, knit together as they are by so many chords of affec-
tion, can no longer live together as members of the same fami-
ly."106
But even emotions that might prove helpful to the nation-
building project-bonds that create loyalty and cohesion within a
heterogeneous group-were treated with suspicion. Madison be-
lieved that those loyalties would operate at a much smaller level
within a comparatively large democracy, creating factions that
would encourage division rather than unity, and would ultimately
undermine the nation-building agenda.10 7 He viewed the emo-
tional unity and enthusiasm surrounding the Revolution as tem-
porary and thought that the "passions most unfriendly to order
and concord" would soon reappear once the immediacy of the
Revolution had vanished into memory.108
2. The Dominant View in Constitutional Culture
Despite the unique historical circumstances, the framers'
theory of human behavior and decision making has continued to
resonate throughout American constitutional history and into the
modern era. In particular, constitutional commitments are seen
as a safeguard against emotion's negative impact on public life.
Abraham Lincoln's famed 1838 Lyceum speech captured the do-
minant view's legacy in its starkest form: "Passion has helped us;
103. See id. at 5.
104. HALL, supra note 12, at 31; MARCUS, supra note 13, at 24-25.
105. Lewis, supra note 99, at 57.
106. THE FEDERALIST No. 14, at 88 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
107. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
108. See THE FEDERALIST No. 49, supra note 76, at 341.
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but can do so no more. It will in future be our enemy. Reason,
cold, calculating, unimpassioned reason, must furnish all the ma-
terials for our future support and defence."109 Unsurprisingly, he
deemed reason synonymous with "general intelligence, . . . moral-
ity, and ... a reverence for the constitution."110
Lincoln's perspective aligned with standard views of citizenship
that position rational judgment as the sole means for obtaining
substantive and procedural legitimacy, just outcomes, and social
progress.11 1 Under this model, citizens must have the opportunity
to consider-in a calm, sober state-the implications and conse-
quences of different options and decisions.112 Emotion and intui-
tion threaten democratic progress, which can only occur through
deliberative or republican processes that advance the rule of rea-
son.11 3
In turn, emotion threatens the maintenance of constitutional
order because it can potentially lead individuals to ignore prior
commitments or imagine new commitments that are irrational or
unwise. As a result, popular involvement in defining constitu-
tional meaning should not be trusted, particularly in situations
where elements critical to reason-knowledge and time to obtain,
consider, and evaluate relevant information-are absent.
The legacy of rationality-preferencing bleeds into many aspects
of contemporary constitutional law and politics. As any observer
of a first-year constitutional law class will notice, legal elites are
systematically trained to discount and ignore emotion, moral in-
tuition, and imagination when trying to define, interpret, and ad-
vocate on behalf of constitutional commitments. Comments that
reflect feelings are actively discouraged (or secretly feared) by
most professors. This discouragement stems from a concern that
109. Abraham Lincoln, Address Before the Young Men's Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois
(Jan. 27, 1838), in 1 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 108, 115 (Roy P. Bas-
ler ed., 1953).
110. See id.
111. See James H. Kuklinski et al., Thinking About Political Tolerance, More or Less
with More or Less Information, in RECONSIDERING THE DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC 225, 227
(George E. Marcus & Russell L. Hanson eds., 1993); George E. Marcus et al., Dynamic
Models of Emotional Response: The Multiple Roles of Affect in Politics, 5 RES. IN
MICROPOLITICS 33, 34 (1996).
112. But see Marcus et al., supra note 111, at 34-35 (explaining how humans do not
always process all information before making a decision, as the rational-judgment theory
would suggest).
113. Kuklinski et al., supra note 111, at 227.
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the classroom will reflect pathological and seemingly uncontrolla-
ble behaviors often associated with emotion.114 Instead, constitu-
tional law becomes interchangeable with "thinking like a lawyer,"
perpetuated by a Socratic method pedagogy that structures inqui-
ries to ensure that feelings are kept under tight control and on
limited display. This perpetuates what psychologist Carol Gilli-
gan calls a dissociative state-a condition under which individu-
als are not permitted to know what they know.115
Beyond the classroom, the notion that emotion is destructive to
the process of constitutional commitment making, interpretation,
and inquiry finds reinforcement throughout contemporary consti-
tutional culture.116 In particular, this notion operates as the ex-
clusive behavioral model for constitutional interpretation by
judges, 117 with "emotional" thrown around as an epithet at judges
who are perceived as advancing a personal moral agenda.118 As
Richard Posner notes, "The law itself is conventionally regarded
as a bastion of 'reason' conceived of as the antithesis of emotion,
as operating to rein in the emotionality of the behavior that gives
rise to legal disputes."119 Consider, for example, the Casey joint
opinion's description of the forces seeking to undermine Roe v.
114. For an interesting example of an academic community wrestling with the role of
emotion in constitutional discourse, see Posting of Orin Kerr to The Volokh Conspiracy,
http://www.volokh.com/archives/archive_200504_10-2005-04-16.shtml#1113585884 (Apr.
15, 2005, 13:24 EST).
115. CAROL GILLIGAN, THE BIRTH OF PLEASURE: A NEW MAP OF LOVE 23-24, 228
(2003).
116. See Erin Ryan, The Discourse Beneath: Emotional Epistemology in Legal Delibera-
tion and Negotiation, 10 HARv. NEGOT. L .REV. 231, 234 (2005).
117. See Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal
Punishment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 655, 665-66 (1989); see also Jeffrey Rosen, Sentimental
Journey: The Emotional Jurisprudence of Harry Blackmun, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 2,
1994, at 13 (addressing how Justice Blackmun's reliance on emotion when deciding cases
rendered him ineffective as a Justice). For alternative perspectives on the relationship be-
tween the judicial role and emotion, see Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944)
(arguing that "[h]eart and mind ... cannot be altogether parted in law more than in life");
William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and "The Progress of Law", 10 CARDOZO L. REV.
3, 3 (1988) (claiming that the "interplay of... reason and passion[ ] does not taint the
judicial process, but is in fact central to its vitality"). For a historical perspective on this
theory of judicial independence, see Bruce A Green & Rebecca Rophie, Regulating Discour-
tesy on the Bench: A Study in the Evolution of Judicial Independence (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author).
118. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 639 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing
majority opinion as "long on emotive utterance and ... short on relevant legal citation");
Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Leader: The Arrogance of Justice Anthony Kennedy, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, June 18, 2007, at 16, 19.
119. Richard A. Posner, Emotion Versus Emotionalism in Law, in THE PASSIONS OF
LAW 309, 309 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999).
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Wade: "Some of those efforts may be mere unprincipled emotional
reactions; others may proceed from principles worthy of profound
respect."120 Or, the final words of the Eleventh Circuit panel de-
cision denying Terry Schiavo's parents' motion for a temporary
restraining order directing her husband to bring her to a hospital
for medical treatment: "While the position of our dissenting col-
league has emotional appeal, we as judges must decide this case
on the law."121 Or, Justice Anthony Kennedy's recent portrayal of
law as an effort to "bring rationality to an existence that can be
irrational and chaotic."122 As Justice Harry Blackmun stated in
his majority opinion in Roe, the Court's job "is to resolve the issue
by constitutional measurement, free of emotion."123
For the most part, constitutional theory has operated to rein-
force the notion of constitutional commitments as barriers
against the corrosive effects of emotion. This has happened pri-
marily through reliance upon two popular analogies to explain
and justify constitutional commitments. In the first analogy, a
commitment operates as "Peter sober" speaking to "Peter
drunk"-the voice of past reason guiding a confused individual
through a turbulent, intoxicated present. 124 In the second analo-
gy, drawn from The Odyssey, Ulysses confronts the Sirens, whose
beautiful song lures sailors to their deaths.125 Unwilling to miss
the opportunity to hear their singing, he instructs his crew to
plug their ears and tie him to the mast of the boat before they
meet the Sirens.126 The crew is further instructed to lash him
more tightly to the mast if he protests. 127 The plan is successfully
implemented-Ulysses is able to enjoy the show and survive the
trip-successfully stifling the uncontrollable urges of future pas-
120. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992).
121. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1229 (11th Cir. 2005) (per cu-
riam).
122. See Rosen, supra note 118, at 16.
123. Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973); see also State v. Post, 20 N.J.L. 368, 369
(1845) (declaring arguments that the New Jersey Constitution forbids slavery as "ad-
dressed to the feelings rather than to the legal intelligence of the court").
124. For a history of the analogy, see Samuel Issacharoff, The Enabling Role of Demo-
cratic Constitutionalism: Fixed Rules and Some Implications for Contested Presidential
Elections, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1985, 1988 & n.13 (2003).
125. THE ODYSSEY OF HOMER 173-74 (T.E. Lawrence trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1991)
(1932).
126. Id. at 173.
127. Id.
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sion.128 Both analogies reflect a theory of human behavior that
establishes a rigid separation between reason and emotion, with
calm, deliberative reason offered as a clearly superior alternative
to the immediacy and destructive effects of emotion.129
Often, this perspective is closely tied to the need for judicial
supremacy-the notion that the Court should serve as the sole
and final arbiter of constitutional meaning. As Richard Parker
recognized, constitutional theory has a history of pathologizing
popular constitutional engagement as "emotional" instead of "rea-
sonable," "impulsive" rather than "deliberate," "self-centered" in-
stead of "public-spirited," "abusive" rather than "respectful," and
"intoxicated" as opposed to "sober."130 Popular emotional senti-
ments are viewed as destructive to the constitutional endeavorl3l
and perceived as "irrational response[s] [that do] not evidence a
process of moral reasoning worthy of respect."132
Finally, psychological dynamics underlying interest-group poli-
tics feed the rationality-preferencing norm as well. Members of a
group tend to see their own group's perspective and decision-
making process as the product of rational thought. By contrast, a
given group will more likely see the decision making of other
groups as governed by emotion and feeling. 133 The result is a con-
stitutional culture where groups with a stake in the outcome of
an interpretive debate lay claim to the exalted status of rationali-
ty using accusations about emotion to deride other perspectives
and diminish their opponents' intellectual stature or relative so-
cial status. 134
128. JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND
IRRATIONALITY (1984).
129. For a critique of the Ulysses analogy, see JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND
DISAGREEMENT 268 (1999).
130. PARKER, supra note 8, at 57-58.
131. See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG 19 (2006) (outlining the framers' view that "the general pub-
lic should be educated to feel only 'veneration' for their Constitution rather than be en-
couraged to use their critical faculties" to interpret its meaning).
132. Larry D. Kramer, Undercover Anti-Populism, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1343, 1354
(2005).
133. See Jared B. Kenworthy & Norman Miller, Attributional Biases About the Origins
of Attitudes: Externality, Emotionality, and Rationality, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 693, 702 (2002).
134. See id. at 693 (quoting opposing sides of Bush v. Gore that suggest "strategic,
group-serving use" of allegations about whether a court's decision is grounded in "sound
reasoning'); see also Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social
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C. Emotion Management in Constitutional Design
Constitutional law, like many other forms of law, functions as
an elaborate system of emotion management.1 35 Through its se-
paration of powers provisions, the Constitution channels emo-
tional expression into particular legislative, judicial, and admin-
istrative fora. Through its directives on institutional structure, it
establishes decision-making rules and customary practices that
validate, reject, or transform emotional expression in particular
ways and delineate the actors whose emotional expressions are
recognized within particular contexts.1 36 And by providing me-
chanisms for the resolution of social conflict, the Constitution re-
strains the strong emotions triggered by uncertainty or unex-
plained phenomena.137
In an effort to manage the adverse effects of emotion, the do-
minant view influenced core features of constitutional design.
Most prominently, it informed the design of Article V, which sets
out the formal mechanics for establishing or altering constitu-
tional commitments.138
Article V serves as the connective tissue between imagination
and commitment in three different ways: procedural, institution-
al, and substantive. From a procedural perspective, it regulates
the balance between commitment and imagination within the
realm of formal amendment, establishing the precise terms under
which constitutional commitments can be made, altered, and bro-
ken. From an institutional perspective, it constrains imagination
through procedural hurdles in the amendment process and chan-
nels imagination into other arenas, transferring the locus of con-
Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 823 (2001).
135. See GOLEMAN, supra note 9, at 5 ("[T]he first laws and proclamations of ethics ...
can be read as attempts to harness, subdue, and domesticate emotional life."); MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW 12 (2004); Peggy A.
Thoits, The Sociology of Emotions, 15 ANN. REV. OF SOC. 317, 336 (1989) ("[E]motion
norms are produced by and function to sustain dominant institutional arrangements.").
136. See Francesca Polletta, The Laws of Passion, 35 L. & SOC'Y REV. 467, 473-76
(2001) (reviewing THE PASSIONS OF LAW, supra note 119) (discussing how courts handle
litigants' emotional expressions).
137. See GILBERT, supra note 10, at 187-89 (stating that unexplained events have a
heightened emotional impact).
138. Whether Article V provides the exclusive method for constitutional amendment is
a matter of significant debate. See Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L.
REV. 1737, 1760-61 (2007) (arguing that civil rights statutes and advances have achieved
the functional equivalent of constitutional amendments).
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stitutional innovation toward the courts, state constitutions, and
other non-Article V mechanisms for change. And from a substan-
tive perspective, it requires consensus among a wide range of po-
litical actors at both the state and federal level. This impacts the
imagination process itself, altering visions for change139 and ma-
nipulating the participants and levels of abstraction at which
conversations about America's constitutional future take place. 140
In regulating the balance between commitment and imagina-
tion, the framers designed Article V as a means of emotion man-
agement and control, with emotion seen as destructive to the es-
tablishment and maintenance of sound constitutional
commitments.141 In Federalist No. 49, Madison responded to
Thomas Jefferson's proposal for a more relaxed amendment stan-
dard for the Virginia State Constitution. Madison noted that sub-
jecting constitutional questions to frequent public debate raised
"[t]he danger of disturbing the public tranquility" and "interest-
ing..., public passions."142 He also pointed out that passions
threatened the "true merits of the question," which should only be
represented by reason. 143
Article V relies upon a range of procedural devices to minimize
the influence of emotion in the commitment-making process. Not-
ably, Article V makes the Constitution extremely difficult to
amend, particularly when compared with amendment provisions
in other constitutions.144 The process of garnering significant
139. See William E. Forbath, The Politics of Constitutional Design: Obduracy and
Amendability-A Comment on Ferejohn and Sager, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1965, 1974-80 (2003)
(attributing the Constitution's failure to recognize social welfare rights to Article V con-
straints).
140. See John Ferejohn & Lawrence Sager, Commitment and Constitutionalism, 81
TEX. L. REV. 1929, 1957-59 (2003).
141. This is not to say that checks against passion were the only forces underlying Ar-
ticle V's design. The framers were clearly concerned about the challenges presented by the
unanimity requirement in the Articles of Confederation. See James Madison, Speech Dur-
ing Debate in Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 6, 1788), reprinted in 4 THE FOUNDER'S
CONSTITUTION 580, 582 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). Federalism con-
cerns also motivated the framers to provide an alternative method of constitutional
amendment that was independent of Congress. See Records of the Federal Convention,
reprinted in 4 THE FOUNDER'S CONSTITUTION, supra, 576, 576-78.
142. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, supra note 76, at 340 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961).
143. Id. at 342-43.
144. See Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in RESPOND-
ING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, 237,
260-61 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).
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support at both the federal and state levels imposes significant
transaction costs and time delays, which allow ample time for so-
ber second thoughts.145 Further, the central role of elected repre-
sentatives in the amendment proposal and ratification processes,
rather than direct referenda schemes that appear in other na-
tional and state constitutions, serves as yet another mechanism
to dilute popular passion. 146
Emotion management significantly influenced the formation of
other areas of constitutional design as well. For example, Article
I's bicameralism and presentment requirements act as checks on
emotion's potentially dangerous impact on political behavior by
establishing multiple fora for deliberation and slowing the legis-
lative process to allow time for sober reflection.147 Indeed, Madi-
son envisioned the Senate as an essential "defense to the people
against their own temporary errors and delusions ... stimulated
by some irregular passion." 148 The framers placed age limits on
public office to ensure, at least in part, a level of emotional ma-
turity among the political elite.149 This comported with a vision of
public service and republican government that "does not require
an unqualified complaisance to every sudden breese of passion, or
to every transient impulse which the people may receive from the
arts of men."150 In the modern era, the removal of constitutional
obstacles to the development of the administrative state, like the
demise of the non-delegation doctrine, reflects a judgment about
the desirability of rational judgment in the development of public
policy.
III. COMMITMENT
While the dominant view continues to hold sway over constitu-
tional law and theory, other disciplines have begun to revisit its
core assumptions. In recent years, developments in the social and
natural sciences have questioned the dualistic relationship be-
tween reason and emotion and begun to recharacterize emotion
145. ELSTER, supra note 50, at 101, 103.
146. See Ackerman, supra note 138, at 1775-76.
147. See ELSTER, supra note 50, at 130-31.
148. THE FEDERALIST No. 63, supra note 81, at 425.
149. See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTI-
TUTION 30 (2005).
150. THE FEDERALIST No. 71, supra note 77, at 42.
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as a vital and valuable component of sound decision making com-
ponent. 151 These developments, in turn, have implications for the
way constitutional theory conceives of the relationship between
emotion and commitment.
Constitutional governance facilitates commitment over time
and with it, the substantial benefits associated with individual
and collective consistency.152 Under the dominant view, emotions
undermine these constitutional commitments by displacing rea-
son. They "flood consciousness," leading individuals to abandon
previously held commitments based on impulse, whimsy, and
without appropriate thought and consideration.15 3 During the
Constitutional Convention, Hamilton referenced this concern ex-
plicitly, describing "the popular passions ... [that] spread like
wild fire, and become irresistible."154 In a similar vein, Madison
expressed concern about the threat to democracy presented by the
"turbulency... of unruly passions."155
There is no doubt that, under certain circumstances, affective
forces can lead people astray and distort consciousness in ways
that can be destructive to their short- and long-term interests.156
These forces can alter individuals' perspective on the future,157
warp their perception of risk,158 facilitate prejudice,159 manipu-
late attitudes based on mood, 160 ignore information,161 distort
processes of analytic and analogical reasoning,162 contribute to
151. LEDOUX, supra note 11, at 19-20.
152. See supra notes 47-63 and accompanying text.
153. See LEDOUX, supra note 11, at 19-20 (discussing how emotions work to motivate
behavior).
154. 1 RECORDS, supra note 97, at 289.
155. Id. at 430-31.
156. See Loewenstein & Lerner, supra note 6, at 627-28; George Loewenstein, Out of
Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior, 65 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 272, 272 (1996).
157. See Daniel T. Gilbert et al., The Future Is Now: Temporal Correction in Affective
Forecasting, 88 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 430, 430-31
(2002).
158. See Paul Slovic, Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics, and Science: Surveying the Risk-
Assessment Battlefield, 19 RISK ANALYSIS 689, 689 (1999).
159. See Susan T. Fiske, What We Know About Bias and Intergroup Conflict, the Prob-
lem of the Century, 11 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 123, 123 (2002) (reviewing
research connecting fear and anxiety to automatic prejudice against particular groups).
160. See Blumenthal, supra note 74, 25-27.
161. See Eric A. Posner, Law and the Emotions, 89 GEO. L. J. 1977, 2011 (2001).
162. See Norbert Schwarz & Herbert Bless, Happy and Mindless, But Sad and Smart?
The Impact of Affective States on Analytic Reasoning, in EMOTION AND SOCIAL JUDGMENTS
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the prioritization of short-term benefit over long-term gain,163
and create bias in certain decision-making contexts. 164
Yet these critiques do not tell the whole story. This part uses
recent developments in the social and natural sciences to argue
that emotion-derided by the dominant view for its potential to
destabilize commitments-also serves as a vital stabilizing force,
enabling constitutional commitments to survive and thrive over
time and across generations.
Specifically, emotions (1) help turn abstract commitments into
individual habits and monitor people's adherence to those com-
mitments through enthusiasm and anxiety, (2) operate as a stabi-
lizing force for individual behavior and political preferences with-
in a large and heterogeneous constitutional culture, and (3) are
integral to interpretation-the process by which a society deter-
mines the precise meaning and terms of preexisting constitution-
al commitments.
A. Habit, Enthusiasm, and Anxiety
Habit provides the essential bridge between constitutional
commitment and emotion, as effective commitments often embed
themselves in habitual behavior. For example, if a professor
wants to make a commitment that she will be on time for her 9:00
a.m. class, her chances of success will increase dramatically if she
establishes a habitual morning routine that allows her to predict
reliably the precise time she must leave her home to make it to
class.
Constitutional systems work in a similar way. If one goal of a
constitutional system is to maintain consistency over time, habi-
tual behavior and customary practices are the best available me-
chanisms to sustain constitutional institutions.165 For example, if
55, 56 (Joseph P. Forgas ed., 1991); Neta C. Crawford, The Passion of World Politics:
Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships, 24 INT'L SECURITY 116, 141-42
(2000).
163. See Colin Camerer et al., Neuroeconomics: How Neuroscience Can Inform Econom-
ics, 43 J. ECON. LITERATURE 9, 40-41 (2005).
164. This bias is created particularly when emotions are strongly held. See Martha C.
Nussbaum, "Secret Sewers of Vice" Disgust, Bodies, and the Law, in THE PASSIONS OF
LAW, supra note 119, at 19, 35-38; Rose McDermott, The Feeling of Rationality: The
Meaning of Neuroscientific Advances for Political Science, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 691, 700-01
(2004).
165. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 102, 161, 163-64 (1990); Richard
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widespread citizen participation in elections is essential to the
continued survival of our constitutional system, voting should be-
come habitual behavior. Similarly, if citizens who disagree with a
given decision are called upon to comply with it nonetheless, 166
their willingness to do so is based, in no small part, on habits of
compliance with the rule of law that legitimate the decision. In
the end, individual and collective habits-including compliance
with the rule of law-produce the consistency and predictability
that are among the primary benefits of a written constitution.
Habit is also essential to getting around the thorny problem of
constitutional consent. Because those who participated in draft-
ing and ratifying the Constitution are long dead, the current in-
carnation of the American polity must reckon with a government
"of the people" where none of "the people" ever formally consented
to their current form of government.1 67 Instead, their consent, as
John Locke recognized long ago, is often tacit.168 The practice of
constitutional habits, rather than a conscious act of consent, pro-
vides contemporary democratic legitimacy for America's constitu-
tional order.
According to the dominant view, emotion undermines the
commitment-facilitating function of constitutions by causing indi-
viduals to discard existing commitments in favor of immediate
short-term considerations, like addicts who "fall off the wa-
gon."169 Moreover, the unpredictable, subconscious, and intense
nature of emotion facilitates inconsistent behavior.170 In this
light, emotion becomes a real and substantial threat to rule-of-
law values and stability, which constitutional commitments and
habits are designed to promote. Yet habit-the linchpin of consis-
tency and commitment-requires emotion to help establish and
maintain habitual behavior.
H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1795-96 (2005).
166. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992) (explaining
how the Constitution calls on people to accept a "common mandate" under the Constitu-
tion).
167. See RUBENFELD, supra note 32, at 81. For an early articulation of this problem,
see David Hume, Of the Original Contract, in 1 EsSAYS, MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LITERARY
443, 447 (T.H. Green & T.H. Grose eds., 1875).
168. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 365-66 (Peter Laslett ed.,
1967).
169. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 157-64 and accompanying text.
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Most significantly, emotion-processing regions of the brain play
a significant role in facilitating learned habitual behavior and the
accompanying consistency and stability.171 A recent neuroimag-
ing study suggests a strong connection between emotional regions
of the brain and habitual, addictive behavior, like smoking.172
Researchers studying patients with damage to the insula-a re-
gion of the brain thought to trigger conscious bodily responses to
anticipated emotional events (e.g., initiating the conscious urge to
smoke by anticipating the pleasure of a cigarette)-discovered a
strong relationship between the localized nature of the damage
and the ability to quit smoking. 173 As one of the researchers
noted, "[T]he fact that insular damage breaks down a learned ha-
bit such as smoking, demonstrates a powerful link between habit
and emotion or feeling."174 This is not to claim that nicotine ad-
diction is individually or socially beneficial. But, as a fairly ex-
treme form of commitment, it underscores the connection be-
tween emotion and habit and the ways in which people's
emotional infrastructure facilitates the sort of consistency and
stability that enable commitments to thrive.
The intersection between habit and emotion also helps individ-
uals monitor their adherence to prior commitments. Political
scientist George Marcus underscores the critical role of two emo-
tional subsystems-one dominated by enthusiasm and the other
by anxiety and fear-that govern individual political behavior.175
As he puts it, "Affective attachments and affective control sys-
tems anchor enduring patterns of behavior" by rewarding beha-
vior that is consistent with previously established goals and by
monitoring the environment for departures from the norm.176
The first system, dominated by enthusiasm, monitors individu-
als' progress toward particular goals and triggers positive emo-
tional responses (i.e., enthusiasm) when progress is made toward
those goals.1 77 This, in turn, assists in the creation of habitual
171. MARCUS, supra note 13, at 82-83.
172. Nasir H. Naqvi et al., Damage to the Insula Disrupts Addiction to Cigarette Smok-
ing, 315 Sci. 531 (2007).
173. Id. at 533.
174. Carl Marziali, Smokers Quit After Brain Region Damage, USC NEWS, http://www.
usc.edu/uscnews/stories/13312.html (quoting Hanna Damasio).
175. MARCUS ET AL., supra note 68, at 65.
176. Marcus, Emotions and Politics, supra note 6, at 223-24.
177. MARCUS, supra note 13, at 81.
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behavior. Through trial and error, emotions provide signals about
which actions work best to achieve an objective and create auto-
matic dispositions to behave in ways that help achieve individual
and collective goals. 178
Political advertising has long recognized this dynamic, using
enthusiasm as an anchoring force for consistency and commit-
ment. For example, individuals who watch campaign advertise-
ments containing enthusiasm cues will more likely have their
prior views about a candidate reinforced. 179 Enthusiasm "rein-
force[s] existing preferences and discourage[s] change"180 and, in
turn, functions as a stabilizing force in public opinion. 18 1
The second system, dominated by anxiety, triggers emotional
responses when something departs from the norm and helps indi-
viduals monitor their external environments. 182 This surveillance
system is tied to threat and serves as an alert mechanism to focus
attention to forces that are unusual or destabilizing.183 This
enables individuals to immediately and efficiently channel their
resources toward threats to stability and consistency. Hence,
through anxiety and fear, people can detect and focus on "norma-
tive deviations" from the status quo that represent potential
threats to their previously held commitments.18 4 They can then
take appropriate action to maintain their commitments and ha-
bits.
B. Emotions as a Stabilizing Force
Commitments facilitate consistency and predictability. In the
dualistic battle between reason and emotion, reason has always
been seen as having consistency on its side and, with it, a mode of
decision making that advances rule-of-law values.1 85 A growing
body of research, however, suggests that emotion is a critical
178. Id. at 81-82.
179. BRADER, supra note 13, at 114-18.
180. Id. at 118.
181. Id. at 119.
182. Elizabeth Theiss-Morse et al., Passion and Reason in Political Life: The Organiza-
tion of Affect and Cognition and Political Tolerance, in RECONSIDERING THE DEMOCRATIC
PUBLIC 248, 254, 266 (George E. Marcus & Russell C. Hanson eds., 1993).
183. George E. Marcus et al., Linking Neuroscience to Political Intolerance and Politi-
cal Judgment, 17 POL. & LIFE SCI. 165,168-69 (1998).
184. Id.
185. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
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force in stabilizing decisions and preferences over time and may
play a much larger role in establishing consistency within a con-
stitutional regime than previously believed.186
First and foremost, emotions enforce behavioral norms in an
environment where constant monitoring of individual behavior is
neither realistic nor desirable. When external threats of punish-
ment or reward are absent, emotions like embarrassment, pride,
and vanity ensure individual and collective behavioral confor-
mance with established legal and cultural norms.18 7 Shame and
guilt impose psychological costs on individual departures from
collective commitments, whether or not someone else enforces the
commitment. 188
Moreover, affective forces help stabilize people's evaluations of
the world around them. The systems of social relationship-like
families or nations-that enable stable, transgenerational com-
mitments to survive are held together by emotional bonds based
in love and pride.l89 These social relationships, particularly fami-
lies, are critical to the development of civic awareness and politi-
cal engagement. 190
Indeed, much of Americans' political behavior is grounded in
emotions and habits19l that help citizens form and maintain sta-
ble partisan affiliations,192 shape our attitudes toward candi-
dates, 193 dictate attitudes toward civil liberties,194 and motivate
our desire to defend the status quo. 195 For example, in a recent
study, strongly partisan citizens who had an emotional stake in
the outcome of the 2004 presidential election were confronted
186. See, e.g., Theiss-Morse et al., supra note 182, at 266.
187. See Susan Shott, Emotion and Social Life: A Symbolic Interactionist Analysis, 84
AM. J. Soc. 1317, 1323-24 (1979).
188. FRANK, supra note 15, at 53.
189. See HAIDT, supra note 10, at 48-49.
190. Hugh McIntosh et al., The Influence of Family Political Discussion on Youth Civic
Development: Which Parent Qualities Matter?, 40 POL. SCI. & POL. 495, 495 (2007).
191. Kinder, supra note 6, at 279; MARCUS, supra note 13, at 84.
192. See John T. Jost et al., Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition, 129
PSYCHOL. BULL. 339, 340 (2003).
193. Robert P. Abelson et al., Affective and Semantic Components in Political Person
Perception, 42 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 619, 619 (1982).
194. GEORGE E. MARCUS ET AL., WITH MALICE TOWARD SOME: How PEOPLE MAKE
CIVIL LIBERTIES JUDGMENTS (1995).
195. See John T. Jost & Orsolya Hunyady, Antecedents and Consequences of System-
Justifying Ideologies, 14 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 260, 261-62 (2005).
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with information about their preferred candidate that would lead
to an emotionally negative conclusion about the candidate.196 Ra-
ther than adopting the negative conclusion, most study partici-
pants adopted an alternative conclusion that minimized the im-
pact of the emotionally threatening information and favored their
preferred candidate.197 During this reasoning process, research-
ers performed brain scans on the participants and observed in-
creased activity in brain regions involved in emotion
processing.198 They concluded that neural information processing
occurs differently when individuals have a "strong emotional
stake" in the outcome of the election and that regions of the brain
involved in "implicit [emotion] regulation" help maintain partisan
attitudes in the face of potentially unfavorable information.199
Emotions also stabilize preferences within a heterogeneous
group. In one recent set of studies by Michael Tuan Pham, indi-
viduals were split into two groups and asked to evaluate a range
of stimuli.200 One group was asked to pay attention to their feel-
ings about the stimuli and to disregard any reason-based assess-
ments. 201 The other group was asked to make their evaluations
purely on reason-based assessments. 202 The studies concluded
that judgments made by the feelings group showed greater con-
sistency across individuals than judgments made by the reason
group.203
In addition, affective forces play a role in creating consistent
and stable preferences within individuals. One recent study de-
fined stable preferences through transitivity, meaning that for a
set of objects-A, B, and C-if A is preferred over B and B is pre-
ferred over C, then A will be preferred over C.204 Participants
196. Drew Westen et al., Neural Bases of Motivated Reasoning: An fMRI Study of Emo-
tional Constraints on Partisan Political Judgment in the 2004 U.S. Presidential Election,
18 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCI. 1947, 1948 (2006).
197. Id. at 1955.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Michel Tuan Pham et al., Affect Monitoring and the Primacy of Feelings in Judg-
ment, 28 J. CONSUMER RES. 167, 171, 176, 178, 182 (2001).
201. Id. at 171.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 184.
204. Leonard Lee et al., In Search of Homo Economicus: Preference Consistency, Emo-
tions, and Cognition 9 (2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=925978 (click "Down-
load" hyperlink; then click "SSRN to open" hyperlink).
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were asked to engage in a set of preference identification tasks
under two different sets of conditions. 205 One group was placed
under a set of conditions that emphasized emotional processing in
preference identification; 206 the other group operated under con-
ditions that allowed for greater cognitive input.207 The studies
confirmed a higher level of transitivity among the affect-based
group, concluding that "emotional processes can also contribute to
greater preference stability and consistency within individu-
als."20 8
Moreover, emotion is not always the unpredictable, unruly
force that the dominant view calls to mind, regardless of its vis-
ceral impact, often automatic nature, and potentially subcons-
cious roots. Instead, internal and external forces stabilize affec-
tive expression and constrain emotional response, rendering
emotions far more predictable and stable than the dominant view
would allow.
Emotions are held in check, over time, by internal systems of
regulation that disfavor emotional extremes. 209 Hence, people
over-predict the strength and duration of an emotional response
to an event, due in part to their failure to recognize their internal
ability to regulate their emotions in ways similar to body temper-
ature.210 Conscious behavioral and cognitive actions-distraction,
venting, suppression, exercise, and cognitive reframing-also
help stabilize the type and strength of an emotional response
within particular parameters. 211
Externally, culture plays a major role in constructing-and
therefore constraining-emotional response. 212 From the world,
205. See id. at 13, 17.
206. Id. at 13.
207. Id. at 17.
208. Id. at 25.
209. See Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in Affec-
tive Forecasting, 75 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 617, 618 (1998) (describing how pes-
simism acts as a defense mechanism curtailing happiness when a perceived negative event
turns out not to be very bad).
210. Id. at 617.
211. See Randy J. Larsen & Zrjesdana Prizmic, Affect Regulation, in HANDBOOK OF
SELF-REGULATION: RESEARCH, THEORY, AND APPLICATIONS 40, 42-49 (Roy F. Baumeister
& Kathleen D. Vohs eds., 2004). See generally James J. Gross, The Emerging Field of Emo-
tion Regulation: An Integrative Review, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 271 (1998).
212. Batja Mesquita, Emotions as Dynamic Cultural Phenomena, in HANDBOOK OF
AFFECTIVE SCIENCES, supra note 6, at 871, 871.
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people learn emotional responses to different stimuli, physical
symptoms associated with a given emotional response, and to in-
terpret others' emotions through a culturally defined lens.213
They learn "proper" and "improper" emotional behaviors-and to
interpret the propriety of different emotions-through emotional
rules or scripts that create paradigmatic responses to particular
stimuli.2 14 These scripts are often transmitted and reinforced
through popular culture and archetypal narratives. For example,
Romeo and Juliet-a story that is retold, in one form or another,
throughout American popular culture-tells people the way ro-
mantic love is supposed to feel.215
Not surprisingly, emotional responses to different stimuli vary
across cultures. 21 6 Non-western cultures, for instance, care more
about maintaining relationships and engaging with people than
their American counterparts. 21 7 Americans are also more likely to
feel anger in response to injustice than the Japanese. 218 Other
studies have documented culturally specific manifestations of
emotional behavior, including facial and vocal expression. 219
Emotional scripts maintain their relevance even in the face of
evidence that the scripts do not accurately describe emotional re-
ality. For example, we express sadness at funerals even if we are
downright hostile toward the decedent; we express joy at wed-
dings even if we have doubts about the merits of the union; we
express pride in our country by standing during the national an-
them even when our collective actions provoke shame; we express
disgust at certain sexual practices even when we engage in them.
While internal and external forces operate to stabilize emo-
tions, conscious reasoning is far from perfect as a model for stabil-
ity. Indeed, it can potentially destabilize perception and judg-
ment. When individuals are asked to explain the reasons behind
their attitudes, they are more likely to be dissatisfied with their
213. Cheshire Calhoun, Making up Emotional People: The Case of Romantic Love, in
THE PASSIONS OF LAW, supra note 119, at 217, 220.
214. Id. at 220; ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE MANAGED HEART: COMMERCIALIZA-
TION OF HUMAN FEELING 56, 58, 59, 74 (1983).
215. Calhoun, supra note 213, at 221.
216. Mesquita, supra note 212, at 871.
217. See id. at 876.
218. Id. at 875.
219. NICO H. FRIJDA, THE EMOTIONS 62, 68 (1986).
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choice, 220 change their attitudes, 221 and display lower consistency
between the attitude and subsequent behavior.222 These dynam-
ics are particularly relevant under conditions of limited know-
ledge about the attitude object. 223 Indeed, when the choice under
consideration is particularly complex, conscious deliberative con-
sideration can actually lead to objectively less optimal outcomes
when compared with choices made with minimal deliberation. 224
C. Emotions, Attitudes, and Interpretation
The underlying meaning of constitutional commitments is often
ambiguous. More than other legal commitment devices-statutes,
regulations, bank notes, or commercial contracts-the Constitu-
tion's vague language and age, as well as the absence of consen-
sus about appropriate interpretive methodology, leaves open a
wide range of plausible interpretations.
Given a text that is subject to multiple interpretations, how do
individuals construct the precise meaning of constitutional com-
mitments? How do individuals determine, for example, whether
the word "liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause encompasses a woman's decision to terminate a pregnan-
cy?
The dominant view has long treated interpretation as a process
dominated by reason. Under this view, rational inference,
precedent, and logic provide the ideal model for constructing con-
stitutional meaning. 225 This, in turn, facilitates the need for ex-
220. Timothy D. Wilson et al., Introspecting About Reasons Can Reduce Post-Choice
Satisfaction, 19 PERSONALITY & SoC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 331, 331 (1993).
221. Timothy D. Wilson et al., Introspection, Attitude, Change, and Attitude-Behavior
Consistency: The Disruptive Effects of Explaining Why We Feel the Way We Do, in 22
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 287, 288-89 (Leonard Berkowitz, ed.,
1989).
222. Timothy D. Wilson et al., Effects of Analyzing Reasons on Attitude-Behavior Con-
sistency, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 13 (1984).
223. See Timothy D. Wilson et al., The Disruptive Effects of Explaining Attitudes: The
Moderating Effect of Knowledge About the Attitude Object, 25 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 379, 396, 398 (1989).
224. See Ap Dijksterhuis et al., On Making the Right Choice: The Deliberation-Without-
Attention Effect, 311 SCI. 1005, 1005, 1007 (2006); Timothy D. Wilson & Jonathan W.
Schooler, Thinking Too Much: Introspection Can Reduce the Quality of Preferences and
Decisions, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181, 191 (1991).
225. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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pert judgment in determining what the Constitution means. And
for expertise in rational judgment, we turn to judges.
Regardless of whether emotion is seen as a constructive or de-
structive force, emotion is an inevitable, and often controlling,
dynamic in the way that individuals interpret the Constitution.
Rather than following a rational process of logical inference, their
interpretive faculties are guided by emotion and intuition. Thus,
to the extent that (1) constitutional meaning is constructed by a
mix of judicial and non-judicial actors, or (2) judicial decision
making mirrors the way lay people make decisions about consti-
tutional meaning, emotion is an inevitable element in the way so-
ciety determines the content and meaning of constitutional com-
mitments.
1. Emotions and Constitutional Attitudes
In considering how individuals perceive constitutional com-
mitments, there is one overriding reality: most individuals con-
front constitutional commitments with extremely limited infor-
mation about the constitutional text,226 political institutions like
the Supreme Court,227 or the issues themselves. 228 Moreover, in
an environment where attention to politics is in short supply,229
constitutionally significant issues like abortion, same-sex mar-
riage, and flag burning are fairly low on the public's list of priori-
ties.230
As a result, members of the public often have little incentive to
seek out additional information about the issues that obsessively
occupy constitutional scholars. Moreover, the emotionally charged
nature of many issues may cause the public to avoid engaging in
226. See MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT
POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 70-71 & tbl. 2.2 (1996); Michael C. Dorf, Whose Constitu-
tion Is It Anyway? What Americans Don't Know About Our Constitution-and Why It Mat-
ters, FINDLAW, May 21, 2002, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20020529.html.
227. Doni Gewirtzman, Glory Days: Popular Constitutionalism, Nostalgia, and the
True Nature of Constitutional Culture, 93 GEO. L.J. 897, 919-20 (2005).
228. See Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New
Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287, 1308
tbl.1 (2004).
229. See Gewirtzman, supra note 227, at 917 (providing data suggesting a decline in
political interest over the past 30 years).
230. See Frederic Schauer, The Supreme Court, 2005 Term-Foreword: The Court's
Agenda-and the Nation's, 120 HARv. L. REV. 4, 24 (2006).
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deliberation or debate about these issues out of a widespread dis-
taste for public conflict and concern over violating social
norms.231
Yet, even in a conflict-averse environment of limited interest,
information, and engagement, individuals develop attitudes to-
ward particular people, events, and political issues.232 Attitudes
are "the positive or negative judgment of an attitude object (i.e.,
the entity about which one bears an attitude)."233 Attitudinal
responses are divided into three different categories: affective,
cognitive, and behavioral. 234 The affective component consists of
the emotions and feelings triggered by the attitude object, the
cognitive component corresponds to the "beliefs" elicited, and the
behavioral component includes the actions or predispositions to
act toward the attitude object. 235
The notion that attitudes have affective and cognitive compo-
nents finds reinforcement in dual-process theory.236 The dual-
process theory refers to models of human psychology that posit
the existence of two simultaneous, and often interdependent, op-
erating systems that help people define their relationship to the
world around them and assist their brains in processing informa-
tion.237
231. See Carolyn L. Funk, Process Performance: Public Reaction to Legislative Policy
Debate, in WHAT IS IT ABOUT GOVERNMENT THAT AMERICANS DISLIKE? 193, 195, 198, 200-
01 (John R. Hibbing & Elizabeth Theiss-Morse eds., 2001); JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH
THEISS-MORSE, STEALTH DEMOCRACY: AMERICANS BELIEFS ABOUT How GOVERNMENT
SHOULD WORK 134-35 (2002).
232. But see John Zaller & Stanley Feldman, A Simple Theory of the Survey Responses:
Answering Questions Versus Revealing Preferences, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 579, 579 (1992)
(stating that citizens do not possess specific attitudes, but "a mix of only partially consis-
tent ideas and considerations").
233. SUSAN T. FISKE, SOCIAL BEINGS: CORE MOTIVES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 216
(2004).
234. Alice H. Eagly & Shelly Chaiken, Attitude Structure and Function, in 1 THE
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 269, 271 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al., eds. 4th ed. 1998);
ALICE H. EAGLY & SHELLY CHAIKEN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTITUDES 14 (1993).
235. FISKE, supra note 233, at 216.
236. See Timothy D. Wilson et al., A Model of Dual Attitudes, 107 PSYCHOL. REV. 101,
102 (2000).
237. See Steven J. Breckler & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Affect Versus Evaluation in the
Structure of Attitudes, 25 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 253, 269 (1989) (concluding that af-
fect and evaluation form distinct components of individual attitudes); Sunstein, supra note
25, at 533. See generally DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Shelly Chaiken
& Yaakov Trope eds., 1999).
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The first system, referred to as the rational, cognitive, or cool
system, operates in the realm of beliefs-a set of true-false infe-
rences that involve associations between an object and another
concept. 238 For example, upon confronting a chocolate sundae, in-
dividuals associate "sundae" with the concept of "has calories."239
This system operates primarily in the realm of conscious thought
and is seen as "emotionally neutral, contemplative,... slow, epi-
sodic, and strategic."240
The second system, referred to as associative emotional, expe-
riential, or hot, operates in the realm of feelings-a set of mes-
sages that define whether individuals want to approach or avoid
a particular object.241 It is primarily intuitive, often unconscious,
and focused on gut reactions. 242 This system operates to help eva-
luate both the direction of attitudes-the "how do I feel about it
question," or as social psychologists put it, valence-and the level
of strength or intensity associated with a given attitude.243
While the brain relies on these two parallel systems to process
information, the two systems do not necessarily operate on the
same timeline. The brain is constructed in ways that give emo-
tional reactions an advantage over cognitive processing, a proba-
ble effect of the emotional system's evolutionary function of enabl-
ing quick and efficient fight-or-flight decision making. 244 As
Joseph LeDoux notes, information transmitted through neural
pathways that control intuitive response arrives faster than in-
formation processed through cognitive pathways.245 This intui-
tive reaction, in turn, affects the way people receive information
through the slower cognitive system.246 As a result, people often
238. Lee et al., supra note 204, at 4.
239. See Roger Giner-Sorolla, Affect in Attitude, in DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 237, at 441, 443.
240. Janet Metcalfe & Walter Mischel, A Hot/Cool-System of Delay of Gratification:
Dynamics of Willpower, 106 PSYCHOL. REV. 3, 3 (1999).
241. Lee et al., supra note 204, at 4.
242. See Seymour Epstein et al., Individual Differences in Intuitive-Experiential and
Analytical-Rational Thinking Styles, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 390, 391 (1996).
243. See Michel Tuan Pham, The Logic of Feeling, 14 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 360, 362
(2004).
244. Antoine Bechara et al., Deciding Advantageously Before Knowing the Advanta-
geous Strategy, 275 SCI. 1293, 1294 (1997).
245. See LEDOUX, supra note 11, at 163.
246. BRADER, supra note 13, at 56; Joseph E. LeDoux & Elizabeth A. Phelps, Emotional
Networks in the Brain, in HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS 159, 161 (Michael Lewis et al. eds., 3d
ed. 2008).
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react before they have time to think, and their thoughts are co-
lored by their affective reactions to particular stimuli, including
political issues and leaders. 247
Not surprisingly, "affective processes predominate" in the for-
mation of individual attitudes, particularly when compared with
cognition. 248 For example, the affective reactions people have to
political candidates or particular social policies more strongly
predict how they ultimately evaluate those candidates and poli-
cies than their cognitive reactions. 249 In a comprehensive survey
of the literature, Jack Glaser and Peter Salovey conclude that
"[a]ffective reactions play a major, if not the dominant role in
candidate selection." 250
Feelings function as an important source of information in eva-
luating an attitude object. As a result, citizens will often consult
their emotional reactions toward a particular candidate when as-
sessing the candidate's overall desirability as a potential leader.
In a landmark 1982 study, the results of which have been consis-
tently upheld in the years since, Robert Abelson and his col-
leagues concluded that the emotions voters have toward particu-
lar candidates, like happiness or anger, better predict actual
voting behavior than opinions about the candidates' honesty or
competence. 251 For these reasons, psychologist and political con-
sultant Drew Westen attributes much of the Democratic Party's
pre-Obama political difficulties to a systemic "undervaluation of
emotion," and urges candidates to adopt a renewed strategic focus
on "clear, emotionally compelling appeals."252
247. See Milton Lodge & Charles S. Taber, The Automaticity of Affect for Political
Leaders, Groups, and Issues: An Experimental Test of the Hot Cognition Hypothesis, 26
POL. PSYCHOL. 455, 455 (2005).
248. FISKE, supra note 233, at 225; see also Linda A. Jackson et al., Cognition, Affect,
and Behavior in the Prediction of Group Attitudes, 22 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 306, 313-14 (1996); Howard Lavine et al., On the Primacy of Affect in the Determi-
nation of Attitudes and Behavior: The Moderating Role of Affective-Cognitive Ambivalence,
34 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 398, 398 (1998) (finding that affect exerted a
stronger influence on political attitudes in situations where the affective and cognitive
components of attitude conflict).
249. Eagly & Chaiken, supra note 234, at 278; see Kinder, supra note 6, at 307.
250. Jack Glaser & Peter Salovey, Affect in Electoral Politics, 2 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. REV. 156, 159 (1998).
251. Abelson et al., supra note 193, at 626; see WESTEN, supra note 13, at 118-19 (stat-
ing that the results of the Abelson study have held up in the twenty-five years since).
252. WESTEN, supra note 13, at 43-44.
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Emotion's influence is particularly strong in situations where
individuals have limited information upon which to form be-
liefs253 or allocate limited attention to the choice at hand.254 This
makes the emotions triggered by a given object more like to shape
individual attitudes toward that object. In other words, while
people may not know or have enough information to determine
what they think about a given issue, almost everyone has a feel-
ing about it.255
But emotion's interpretive influence may not be limited to the
ignorant or apathetic. In a recent study, political scientist Ted
Brader challenged the conventional wisdom that only less sophis-
ticated citizens are driven by emotion. Brader conducted an expe-
riment that exposed citizens with varying levels of political know-
ledge to political advertisements designed to trigger enthusiasm
or fear in the viewer. 256 He concluded, on balance, that politically
sophisticated citizens who saw politics as relevant were more res-
ponsive to, and influenced by, emotional cues. 257 Hence, even po-
litically knowledgeable citizens who show relatively high interest
in politics are subject to emotion's influence over their attitudes.
As with attitudes toward political candidates, emotion plays a
critical role in attitude development for a range of constitutional-
ly salient issues. 258 In a 1998 study, Geoffrey Haddock and Mark
Zanna sought to explore the underlying structure of attitudes to-
253. See Norbert Schwarz & Gerald L. Clore, Feelings and Phenominal Experiences, in
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: HANDBOOK OF BASIC PRINCIPLES (Arie W. Krughansh & E. Troy
Higgin eds., 2007); Wendy M. Rahn, Affect as Information: The Role of Public Mood in Po-
litical Reasoning, in ELEMENTS OF REASON: COGNITION, CHOICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF
RATIONALITY 130, 130-31, 150 (Arthur Lupia et al., eds., 2000) (discussing study showing
that "public mood" has a greater impact on opinions among individuals with low political
information); Kari Edwards, The Interplay of Affect and Cognition in Attitude Formation
and Change, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 202, 202 (1990) ("[A]ffective cues are
particularly potent determinants of attitude change when the ability or motivation to
process issue-relevant information is low."); see also Eric J. Johnson & Amos Tversky, Af-
fect, Generalization, and the Perception of Risk, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 20,
20, 30 (1983).
254. Baba Shiv & Alexander Fedorikhin, Heart and Mind in Conflict: The Interplay of
Affect and Cognition in Consumer Decision Making, 26 J. CONSUMER RES. 278, 288 (1999)
(presenting findings showing that when information processing resources are limited, con-
sumer choice is more likely influenced by affective reactions than cognitions).
255. See Kinder, supra note 6, at 295.
256. BRADER, supra note 13, at 99.
257. Id.
258. See Alice H. Eagly et al., Cognitive and Affective Bases of Attitudes Toward Social
Groups and Social Policies, 30 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 113, 133 (1994) (offering a
"general endorsement of the position that affect can underlie attitudes").
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ward the death penalty, with specific attention to the roles that
affect and cognition play in predicting attitudes.259 They con-
cluded that emotional responses were "predictive of attitudes,"
and that affect plays a critical role in attitude formation around
the death penalty.260 This conclusion echoes other research sug-
gesting that emotional reactions were better predictors of indi-
vidual attitudes about sexual morality than rational assessments
about the harmfulness of the conduct. 26 1 Moreover, emotional
responses play a significant role in predicting attitudes toward
abortion, 262 affirmative action, 263 different social groups,2 64 the
Clinton impeachment, 265 the outcome of Bush v. Gore,266 and the
torture at Abu Ghraib prison.267
Hence, even under conditions of what Bruce Ackerman calls
"normal politics"-periods of widespread detachment and disen-
gagement 26 s--there are still emotions and feelings that actively
steer the course of constitutional culture. 269
2. Emotions and Moral Judgment
As constitutional scholar Paul Brest once noted, the "most sig-
nificant issues of public morality are, or once were, or eventually
will be, constitutional issues."270 Indeed, in a society where li-
mited government and equality remain core elements of constitu-
259. Geoffrey Haddock & Mark P. Zanna, Assessing the Impact of Affective and Cogni-
tive Information in Predicting Attitudes Toward Capital Punishment, 22 L. & HUMAN
BEHAV. 325, 326 (1998).
260. Id. at 337.
261. Jonathan Haidt & Matthew A. Hersh, Sexual Morality: The Cultures and Emo-
tions of Conservatives & Liberals, 31 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 191, 214-15 (2001).
262. Haddock & Zanna, supra note 259, at 328.
263. Id.
264. Victoria M. Esses et al., Values, Stereotypes, and Emotions as Determinants of In-
tergroup Attitudes, in AFFECT, COGNITION, AND STEREOTYPING: INTERACTIVE PROCESSES IN
GROUP PERCEPTION 137, 141 (Diane M. Mackie & David L. Hamilton eds., 1993); see also
Jamie Chamberlin, What's Behind Prejudice?, 34 MONITOR ON PSYCHOL. 34, 34 (summa-
rizing research on emotion and prejudice).
265. WESTEN, supra note 13, at 103, 107-08.
266. Id. at 103-04, 109-10.
267. Id. at 103, 110-11.
268. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 230-31 (1991).
269. Kinder, supra note 6, at 281.
270. Paul Brest, Constitutional Citizenship, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175, 178 (1986). But
see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 141 (1999) (ar-
guing that moral philosophy is irrelevant to constitutional law).
2009]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
tional and cultural identity 271 where religion remains a wide-
spread presence in social life and public discourse, and where the
constitutional text frames the relevant law at a high level of ab-
straction, 272 a moral element is likely to lurk, explicitly or latent-
ly, behind virtually every major constitutional dispute.273 It is
nearly impossible to discuss the issues at the heart of contempo-
rary constitutional discourse-like abortion, homosexuality, the
right to die, or affirmative action-without implicating moral
judgment. 274
Traditionally, emotion has been seen as destructive to these
sorts of moral evaluations and decisions. 275 Those critical of emo-
tion's role in moral decision making see emotion as partisan-it
causes people to "play favorites"-and, therefore, detrimental to
the impartial state from which ideal moral judgments should
spring.276 Others see emotion as arbitrary, arising from factors
external to the situation that can flood consciousness and distort
judgment. 277 Finally, some fear emotions automaticity-the in-
tuitive characteristics that lie beyond the realm of voluntary con-
trol and defy the deliberate exercise of free will and conscious
moral reasoning. 278
For many years, academic psychologists echoed and reinforced
these concerns in their study of moral judgment. Traditional
models of moral development and reasoning focused entirely on
cognition and conscious processes and dismissed the potential for
emotion to contribute positively to the moral domain.279 This
school of thought draws its origins from Plato and Immanuel
271. See Donald R. Kinder, Opinion and Action in the Realm of Politics, in 2 THE
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 778, 809-11 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed.
1998).
272. Brest, supra note 270, at 178-79.
273. See id.; see also RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 56-57 (2006) (arguing con-
stitutional interpretation "require[s] a very considerable 'excursion' into political morali-
ty"). For a more extensive descriptive and normative elaboration of this view, see generally
RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION (1996).
274. See KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 6-8 (1984).
275. David Pizarro, Nothing More than Feelings? The Role of Emotions in Moral Judg-
ment, 30 J. THEORY SOC. BEHAV. 355, 355 (2000).
276. Id. at 356.
277. Id. at 357.
278. Id. at 357-58.
279. See id. at 356.
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Kant,280 but found its most recent and influential incarnation
from Lawrence Kohlberg, a leader in the "cognitive revolution"
that overtook psychology in the 1960s. 28 1
This rationalist perspective views moral judgment as primarily
cognitive in nature. Decisions about morality or ethics involve
conscious thinking, can be evaluated from a true-false perspec-
tive, and move toward a set of answers that are universal and
known.28 2 People develop moral competence over time and in
stages of cognitive development beginning in childhood.283 It oc-
curs as individuals cultivate a particular set of aptitudes that as-
sist with moral reasoning 284-like putting one's self in another
person's shoes"-or by creating environmental circumstances that
facilitate moral development.285 At their highest stage of moral
development, individuals can make morally sound decisions that
replicate rule-of-law values through invoking "self-chosen ethical
principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality,
and consistency."286
Today, emotion's role in moral judgment is undergoing a dra-
matic rehabilitation. Emotion is increasingly seen as an essential
and unavoidable component of moral assessment. More impor-
tantly, its presence can, and often does, constructively facilitate
the resolution of issues with a moral component. 2 87 The notion
that emotion is indispensable to moral judgment finds support in
at least two areas of research: (1) social psychology research on
the integration of affective and intuitive forces in moral judgment
and (2) neuroscience research isolating portions of the brain asso-
ciated with emotion processing that are active during moral
judgment tasks. First, Kohlberg's rationalist perspective on moral
reasoning has come under significant fire from Virginia psycholo-
gist Jonathan Haidt, who offers an alternative perspective on
280. Id.
281. Richard A. Shweder & Jonathan Haidt, The Future of Moral Psychology: Truth,
Intuition, and the Pluralist Way, 4 PSYCHOL. SCI. 360, 360 (1993).
282. Haidt, supra note 134, at 818.
283. Id. at 816.
284. Id.
285. See id.
286. Brest, supra note 270, at 176 (quoting LAWRENCE KOHBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF
MORAL DEVELOPMENT: MORAL STAGES AND THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 19 (1981)).
287. See Brennan, supra note 117, at 3 (exposing this view in the context of constitu-
tional interpretation).
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moral judgment: social intuitionism. 288 According to Haidt, moral
judgments are made at a sub-conscious level and take the form of
gut reactions rather than conscious, deliberative reasoning.289
These intuitions occur "quickly, effortlessly, and automatical-
ly"290 and contain a normative judgment about whether the con-
duct or object under evaluation is good or bad.291 To support his
theory, Haidt conducted a set of experiments where he presented
participants with different scenarios involving sexual morality.292
The studies concluded that participants' emotional reactions to
the scenarios better predicted their moral attitudes than did a
more conscious, cognitive assessment about whether the conduct
was actually harmful to anyone. 293
Conscious, deliberative reasoning plays a role in this model
primarily, though not exclusively, to provide a post-hoc rationali-
zation of an intuitive judgment: the emotional dog wagging its ra-
tional tail.294 While Haidt recognizes the potential for sheer logic
or private reflection to overcome intuitive judgment, he argues
that this rarely happens in practice. 295 Instead, individuals are
far more receptive to social persuasion-group moral norms that
emerge from friends and others in social interactions where other
people exert a moral judgment but do not provide any reasoned
persuasion or articulated rationale. 296
There is also evidence of a relationship between certain emo-
tional capacities, like an ability to discriminate between different
feelings or regulate emotions, and the resolution of moral dilem-
mas. In one study, individuals were presented with the "Asian
disease problem," a decision-making scenario involving a choice
between a certain outcome or an outcome that involves risk.297
288. See Haidt, supra note 134, at 814.
289. See id. at 819-20. For an argument that moral intuitions have an evolutionary
basis, see Paul H. Robinson et al., The Origins of Shared Intuitions of Justice, 60 VAND. L.
REV. 1633, 1639-54 (2007).
290. Haidt, supra note 136, at 818.
291. Id. at 819-20.
292. Haidt & Hersh, supra note 261, at 193.
293. Id. at 214; see also Jonathan Haidt et al., Affect, Culture and Morality, or Is It
Wrong To Eat Your Dog?, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 613, 626 (1993) (concluding
that the role of affect in moral judgment may be variable across cultures).
294. Haidt, supra note 134, at 822-23.
295. Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog Does Learn New Tricks: A Reply to Pizarro
and Bloom, 110 PSYCHOL. REV. 197, 197 (2003).
296. Haidt, supra note 134, at 828-29.
297. See Pablo Fernandez-Berrocal & Natalio Extremera, About Emotional Intelligence
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The study concluded that individuals with a higher self-reported
ability to regulate emotions were more likely to select the risk-
seeking option.298 A similar study showed a relationship between
the ability to identify different emotions or moods and the choices
made when presented with a moral dilemma involving the deci-
sion to divorce. 299 Both studies suggest that moral decision mak-
ing is sensitive to emotional dynamics and that different emo-
tional capacities influence moral outcomes. 300
Second, there is increasing neurobiological evidence that "emo-
tion is a significant driving force in moral judgment."301 Neuros-
cientists have become fairly adept at identifying the regions of the
brain involved in certain types of decision making.302 They have
found significant evidence of increased activity in brain regions
associated with emotion when individuals are confronted with
certain types of moral judgments. 303
In a recent neurobiology study using fMRI data, Joshua Greene
and his colleagues measured brain activity in individuals pre-
sented with moral and non-moral dilemmas. 304 They concluded
that differences in a person's level of emotional engagement im-
pacted moral judgment.305 To support their findings, the experi-
ments concluded that there was a relationship between the choic-
es made and neural activity located in emotional centers of the
brain.306
Moreover, in another study, patients with damage to the ven-
tromedial prefrontal cortex ("VMPC"), a brain region necessary to
generate emotions, more likely adopted a utilitarian approach to
moral judgment. 307 The authors of the study attributed this shift
and Moral Decisions, 28 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 548, 548 (2005).
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 548-49; see also Blumenthal, supra note 74, at 7-8 (concluding that people
superficially process information when they are in a good mood).
301. Joshua Greene & Jonathan Haidt, How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment Work?,
6 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 517, 522 (2002).
302. Robinson et al., supra note 289, at 1660.
303. Id.
304. See Joshua D. Greene et al., An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in
Moral Judgment, 293 SCI. 2105, 2105 (2001).
305. Id. at 2107.
306. Id.
307. Michael Koenigs et al., Damage to the Prefrontal Cortex Increases Utilitarian
Moral Judgments, 446 NATURE 908, 908, 910 (2007).
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in perspective to the diminished role of "social emotions," like
compassion, shame, and guilt, in patients with VMPC damage.308
Both studies provide support for a neurobiological connection be-
tween emotion and moral judgment.309
D. Dualism and the Link Between Emotion and Reason
The dominant view rigidly separates emotion and reason and
places the two forces in tension with one another.310 Indeed, one
of reason's primary benefits is its ability to allow individuals to
discard emotional forces from the decision-making calculus alto-
gether. This dualism informs the American cultural model for
judicial behavior, which seeks to minimize emotion's influence
and delegitimizes its role in constitutional interpretation. 311
To the extent that society views reason as a desirable element
in the interpretive process, evidence increasingly shows that emo-
tion is essential to the successful exercise of reason. This evidence
calls into question the dominant view's dualistic model, which se-
parates reason from emotion and views emotion as a threat to the
exercise of our rational faculties.
From the vantage point of neuroscience, reason and emotion
can and do coexist, minimizing concerns over emotion's ability to
displace reason. As neuroscientists began to delve deeper into the
relationship between brain activity and affective-cognitive re-
sponse, 312 they revealed a human decision-making process in
which emotion and reason are deeply interrelated, with "certain
aspects of the process of emotion and feeling" considered "indis-
pensable for rationality."313
Antonio Damasio's studies of brain-injured patients have been
extremely influential in this area. Damasio's work focused on in-
308. Id.
309. Robinson et al., supra note 289, at 1659-60.
310. See Sheila T. Murphy & R.B. Zajonc, Affect, Cognition, and Awareness: Affective
Priming with Optimal and Suboptimal Stimulus Exposures, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 723, 736 (1993).
311. See supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
312. DAMASIO, supra note 11, at xiv; see Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotional Paternal-
ism, 35 FL. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 18 (2007).
313. DAMASIO, supra note 11, at xiii. The precise extent of the interrelationship and
causal relationship between the two spheres is a matter of great dispute and active in-
quiry. See Blumenthal, supra note 311, at 18-24.
[Vol. 43:623
OUR FOUNDING FEELINGS
dividuals with injuries to portions of their brain that process
emotion. 314 Predictably, these patients experienced a lack of af-
fect and emotional reaction. 315 The patients' reasoning and logi-
cal abilities remained perfectly intact, and they performed nor-
mally on intelligence tests. 316  Nonetheless, the patients
experienced severe impairments in their ability to make basic de-
cisions, categorize, or engage in long-term planning. 317
Individuals rely on subjective affective responses to prioritize
among, or direct their attention to, particular attributes of com-
peting stimuli,318 provide valuable information, 319 and integrate
that information into attitude formation, judgment, and decision
making. 320 Indeed, an individual's feelings deeply impact the
process by which that person will assess risk,321 determine cau-
sality, 322 and assign value to outcomes, 323 all components of tra-
ditional rational analysis. Reason, in turn, often operates to con-
trol emotional reaction. Efforts to reframe a problem,
intellectualize an emotionally volatile situation, or reappraise
emotionally disturbing phenomena are all cognition-driven efforts
to alter, minimize, or regulate emotional response. 324 All of this
suggests that "emotion is part of rationality itself, and that the
two are intimately intertwined and interconnected processes."325
314. DAMASIO, supra note 11, at 32-34.
315. Id. at 34.
316. See id. at 32-37.
317. See id. at 36-37.
318. See Maroney, supra note 7, at 1404-05.
319. See Norbert Schwarz & Gerald L. Clore, Mood, Misattribution, and Judgments of
Well-Being: Informative and Directive Functions of Affective States, 45 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 513, 520 (1983) (showing that individuals use "momentary moods to make
judgments about their general happiness and life satisfaction").
320. Schwarz & Clore, supra note 253, at 434; see Richard A. Posner, The Role of the
Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1049, 1063 (2006).
321. Jennifer S. Lerner & Dacher Keltner, Fear, Anger, and Risk, 81 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 146, 147 (2001); Slovic, supra note 158, at 694.
322. See Pham et al., supra note 200, at 168.
323. Christopher K. Hsee & Yuval Rottenstreich, Music, Pandas, and Muggers: On the
Affective Psychology of Value, 133 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 23, 27 (2004); Samuel M.
McClure et al., Separate Neural Systems Value Immediate and Delayed Monetary Re-
wards, 306 SCI. 503, 506 (2004) (suggesting that bias in favor of immediately available
rewards is connected to activity in portions of the brain that process emotions).
324. See Gross, supra note 211, at 284-85.
325. McDermott, supra note 164, at 693; see also Loewenstein & Lerner, supra note 6,
at 634 ("If expected emotions captured everything that people care about, then the absence
of immediate emotional influences would not degrade decisions as much as it does.").
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E. Emotion and Constitutional Commitment
To sum up thus far, constitutional governance facilitates com-
mitment over time, and with it, the substantial benefits asso-
ciated with individual and collective consistency. Emotion, de-
rided by the framers for its potential to destabilize, operates
instead as a vital stabilizing force that enables prior commit-
ments to survive and thrive. In particular, emotion facilitates ha-
bitual behavior, helps monitor adherence to commitments
through enthusiasm and anxiety, and stabilizes individual beha-
vior and political preferences within a large and heterogeneous
constitutional culture. Further, emotion is a critical influence on
the interpretation of existing constitutional commitments, as well
as the exercise of reason and rationality.
IV. IMAGINATION
As with commitment, emotion is indispensable to imagina-
tion.326 In particular, emotion (1) identifies which commitments
to revisit through the processes of attention, appraisal, and as-
sessment; (2) facilitates a change in attitude towards prior com-
mitments as a result of anxiety; and (3) enables social movements
to initiate a process of commitment revision and renewal through
action tendencies associated with particular emotions.
A. Attention, Appraisal, and Assessment
Imagination encourages individuals to revisit and reconsider
prior commitments in light of other commitments, changed cir-
cumstances, or new information. Despite its potential to distract,
emotion enables individuals to focus on which commitments to
revisit through three processes that are critical to human func-
tioning: attention, appraisal, and assessment. 327
First, emotion grabs and focuses attention.328 In a political and
social environment with multiple stimuli, it is impossible to focus
on everything at once. Emotion helps focus cognitive faculties on
326. For an early articulation of the connection between emotion and imagination, see
DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 220 (David Fate Norton & Mary J. Norton
eds., 2000).
327. See Maroney, supra note 7, at 1404-06.
328. Id. at 1404.
[Vol. 43:623
OUR FOUNDING FEELINGS
areas of personal importance and public concern 329 and sends a
warning signal to revisit prior choices. 330 As emotion theorist Ro-
nald de Sousa points out, "No logic determines salience: what to
notice, what to attend to, what to inquire about."331 It is an emo-
tional reaction-often intuitive and lurking beneath conscious-
ness332-that operates as a tractor beam for cognitive efforts and
helps to "facilitate efficient judgment and decision making."333
Moreover, emotion assists decision making by focusing atten-
tion on a limited range of potentially available alternatives. Da-
masio argues that the human brain attaches a "somatic marker"
to certain potential outcomes, which often takes the form of a gut
reaction to a particular choice.334 These markers are often emo-
tional in nature and assist individuals in making efficient choices
by sending emotional signals that quickly constrain the range of
available alternatives. 335 This, in turn, allows individuals to focus
cognitive faculties on the limited range of options most closely re-
lated to the individuals' overall goal(s). 3 3 6
Emotion also focuses people's attention on particular aspects of
stimuli that initiate behavioral evolution and change. Empathy,
for example, focuses people's attention on the possibility of dis-
tress and can facilitate cooperative and helping behavior. 337 En-
thusiasm increases attention to political campaigns and sets in
motion the desire to get actively involved in the democratic
process. 338
329. Marc D. Lewis, Bridging Emotion Theory and Neurobiology Through Dynamic
Systems Modeling, 28 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 169, 171 (2005); George F. Loewenstein et al.,
Risk as Feelings, 127 PSYCH. BULL. 267, 268 (2001).
330. See D. Don Welch, Ruling with the Heart: Emotion-Based Public Policy, 6 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 55, 67 (1997).
331. RONALD DE SOUSA, THE RATIONALITY OF EMOTION 191 (1987).
332. LEDOUx, supra note 11, at 9 (discussing physiological triggers for fear that pre-
cede cognitive awareness); Jon Elster, Rationality and the Emotions, 106 ECON. J. 1386,
1393 (1996).
333. Melissa L. Finucane et al., Judgment and Decision Making: The Dance of Affect
and Reason, in EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION RESEARCH 327, 347
(Sandra L. Schneider & James Shanteau eds., 2003).
334. DAMASIO, supra note 11, at 173.
335. Id.
336. See id. But see Wilson & Schooler, supra note 224, at 191 (arguing that thinking
may actually draw attention to irrelevant information).
337. Pizarro, supra note 275, at 360.
338. BRADER, supra note 13, at 126; MARCUS, supra note 13, at 89-91; Nicholas A. Va-
lentino et al., Is a Worried Citizen a Good Citizen? Emotions, Political Information Seek-
ing, and Learning via the Internet, 29 POL. PSYCHOL. 247, 265-66 (2008).
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Second, emotion is also critical to appraisal-the process by
which meaning is assigned to an event based upon the event's re-
lationship to an individual's overall goals and well-being.339
When individuals decide to change an existing commitment, they
must first appraise how other existing commitments, and how
any potential new commitments, align with their personal and
collective goals. Emotions convey information about the things an
individual values; 340 sadness and anger, for example, are usually
connected to something one cares about. As a result, the presence
and strength of different emotions enable individuals to gauge the
effectiveness of existing commitments and prioritize among com-
peting commitments and values, a necessary task in virtually
every constitutional conflict. People often look to their feelings to
find out what they care about most and to provide information
about whether a proposed commitment will satisfy or fail to satis-
fy a particular goal. 341
Third, imagination demands that individuals assess the emo-
tional outcomes produced by potential changes. Here too, emotion
drives the process by which individuals envision and evaluate the
future. Most importantly, people make choices based on how they
think they will feel once a given decision is made. In the words of
psychologist Daniel Gilbert, the brain allows individuals to "pre-
feel events."342 People simulate future events in their imagina-
tions and evaluate their emotional reactions to imagined futures.
This process allows individuals to predict their future emotions
with greater accuracy and to make choices to maximize future sa-
tisfaction.343
This "affective forecasting" process is, to some degree,
flawed.344 People unconsciously supply and omit relevant infor-
mation in systematic and predictable ways that distort their pre-
dictive powers. In other words, they rely too much on their feel-
339. Maroney, supra note 7, at 1405.
340. Gerald L. Clore et al., Affective Causes and Consequences of Social Information
Processing, in 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNITION 323, 384-85 (Robert S. Wyer, Jr. &
Thomas K. Srum eds., 2d ed. 1994); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE
INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS 30 (2001).
341. Schwarz & Clore, supra note 253, at 437.
342. GILBERT, supra note 10, at 120.
343. Id.
344. Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic Adaptation,
and Disability, 60 VAND. L. REV. 745, 769-71 (2007); Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the
Emotions: The Problem of Affective Forecasting, 80 IND. L.J. 155, 162-63 (2005).
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ings about the present in assessing their future feelings and fail
to fully account for their emotional adaptability to changed cir-
cumstances. 345
Despite these predictive errors, emotion, from a purely descrip-
tive perspective, helps quantify the expected utility associated
with particular options for change. When people imagine the fu-
ture, they do not simply contemplate rational, bottom-line out-
comes. Instead, they engage in a complex, predictive process that
focuses on how their emotional state will change in response to
different outcomes. Then, they make choices based upon that
predictive assessment.
B. Anxiety and Attitude Change
Emotion offers the potential for intransigence and self-
involvement. Emotional states sometimes make it difficult for in-
dividuals to listen to alternative perspectives and obtain the ben-
efits associated with reasoned deliberation and introspection. 346
As a result, people may not recognize situations where commit-
ments might prove destructive to their long-term self-interest, or
adapt to changing circumstances. 347 Significant empirical evi-
dence supports the proposition that strongly held attitudes are
difficult to change and often go hand-in-hand with strong emo-
tions.348
From this vantage point, emotion may also facilitate attitudes
within constitutional culture, like intolerance, that are seemingly
immune to reasoned argument and destructive to the survival of
heterogeneous democratic societies. 349 In particular, intolerance
stems from perceptions that a particular group represents a
345. GILBERT, supra note 10, at 224-28.
346. See Michael Ignatieff, Getting Iraq Wrong: What the War Has Taught Me About
Political Judgment, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 5, 2007, 26, 29.
347. See id.
348. See Richard E. Petty et al., Emotional Factors in Attitudes and Persuasion, in
HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE SCIENCES, at supra note 6, at 752, 754; Allan P.O. Williams, et
al., MANAGING CHANGE SUCCESSFULLY: USING THEORY AND EXPERIENCE TO IMPLEMENT
CHANGE 307 (2002).
349. Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Performance on Indirect Measures of Race Evaluation
Predicts Amygdala Activation, 12 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCI. 729, 734 (2000) (finding that
amygdala responses to black and white faces in white subjects reflect cultural evaluations
of social groups influenced by individual experience).
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threat to an individual or that individual's group. 350 These threat
perceptions are often driven by emotions like anger and fear that
can cause individuals to overestimate the actual threat or remain
stubborn in the face of information about the actual nature of the
threat.351
Yet this is only part of the story. While emotion may facilitate
intransigence, 352 intolerance, 353 and self-involvement,354 it is al-
so critical to the process of attitude change. Emotion enables in-
dividuals to break from the limitations presented by consistency
and habit when circumstances warrant. For example, political
scientists commonly accept that most voters operate according to
habitual patterns and without much information about a given
candidate's policy positions. 355 Absent a reason to break from
routine, voter behavior is best predicted by a set of partisan affil-
iations that form early in life, along with an assessment of the li-
keability of the candidate.356 Thus, for the most part, reasoned,
well-informed, independent assessments of a candidate's policy
positions simply do not take place.
However, as political scientist George Marcus has shown, an-
xiety is critical in causing individuals to depart from prior habits
and facilitating conscious deliberation.357 Absent anxiety, indi-
vidual political behavior is dominated by prior commitment and
habit.358 But when voters operate under conditions of anxiety,
something strange happens-they become more attentive to the
actual positions taken by candidates, actively seek out new in-
formation, and show a willingness to act based on the new infor-
mation they obtain.359 In short, they behave as rational actors
and are willing to reassess the wisdom of prior commitments and
habits, but only under conditions triggered by an emotional re-
350. See Fiske, supra note 159, at 125, 127.
351. MARCUS ET AL., supra note 194, at 105-09; id. at 124.
352. See Ignatieff, supra note 346, at 29.
353. MARCUS ET AL., supra note 194, at 222.
354. See Leaf Van Boven & George Loewenstein, Social Projection of Transient Drive
States, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1159, 1165-67 (2003) (showing that indi-
vidual predictions of how others will react to emotional situations reflect participant pre-
dictions of how they themselves would react).
355. MARCUS, supra note 13, at 102-03.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 103.
358. Id. at 102-03.
359. Id. at 103-04.
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sponse. 360 Hence, fear and anxiety help "to pry open the door to
attitude change and unexpected choices."3 6 1
Certain emotions also enable impartiality, a critical contextual
tool to breaking habitual patterns. As political theorist Sharon
Krause points out, impartiality involves perspective taking-the
ability to see the world through someone else's eyes. 3 6 2 This sort
of imagination requires emotion: the empathy needed to adopt
another's perspective and the emotional sensitivity required to
understand the pain of discrimination or the pleasure of integra-
tion within a community. 363
C. Emotion and Constitutional Innovation
Changes to a constitutional system, both within and outside
the constraints of Article V, require the intersection of imagina-
tion and the necessary energy and resources for sustained politi-
cal action. The passage of the Nineteenth Amendment,364 the Su-
preme Court's decision to overrule Plessy v. Ferguson,36 5 and the
path of the Court's abortion jurisprudence since Roe v. Wade366-
to name just a few critical moments of constitutional change- all
aligned with the rise of social and political movements. Emotion
fuels these social movements and is necessary to sustain individ-
ual and collective desire for public action. 367 Absent the presence
360. See id.
361. BRADER, supra note 13, at 143.
362. Sharon R. Krause, Assoc. Prof., Brown University, Public Deliberation and the
Feeling of Impartiality 14 (Aug. 31-Sept. 3, 2006).
363. See id. at 14-17; see also NUSSBAUM, supra note 340, at 444-45 (arguing that em-
pathy and compassion are necessary for judges and jurors to fully assess the facts before
them); Deborah A. Small & Jennifer S. Lerner, Emotional Policy: Personal Sadness and
Anger Shape Judgments About a Welfare Case, 29 POL. PSYCHOL. 149, 164 (2008) (explain-
ing how defense attorneys instruct juries to view the case from the defendant's perspective
to "achieve a more lenient sentence").
364. See Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Fe-
deralism, and the Family, 115 HARv. L. REV. 947, 968-69, 1034 (2002).
365. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2072-89 (2002).
366. See Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Consti-
tutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1397-1400 (2006).
367. See Leonie Huddy & Anna H. Gunnthorsdottir, The Persuasive Effects of Emotive
Visual Imagery: Superficial Manipulation or the Product of Passionate Reason?, 21 POL.
PSYCHOL. 745, 766-67 (2000) (concluding that "[k]nowledgeable, involved participants
reacted more strongly to arousing visual imagery and were much more likely to feel posi-
tive about an organization, agree with its goals, objectives, and arguments, and take ac-
tion on its behalf...").
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of emotion, constitutional communities will fall victim to "apathy,
immobility, and ultimately, disintegration."368
Emotions are associated with particular action tendencies. 369
Fear, for example, creates a tendency to engage in "fight or flight"
behavior;370 love initiates behaviors that nurture. 371 These action
tendencies associated with particular emotions motivate individ-
uals to become involved in public life,372 to instigate moral ac-
tion, 373 to engage in acts of altruism,374 and most importantly, to
change the status quo. 37 5 For example, compassion, triggered by
people's perception of suffering, changes the way they see their
relationships with other people and enables altruistic beha-
vior. 376 Shame, guilt, and pride motivate or deter social action,377
and emotional benefits associated with collective identity help
form the glue that holds social movements together.378
In particular, one emotion-hope-is absolutely critical to im-
agination and action within a constitutional system. As Profes-
sors Kathryn Abrams and Hila Keren point out, hope is deeply
connected to an ongoing sense of the law's potential and possibili-
ty. 379 It provides individuals and social movements with the per-
sistence, resourcefulness, and courage necessary to bring about
368. HALL, supra note 12, at 4.
369. Lewis, supra note 329, at 181; see Mesquita, supra note 211, at 876-78 (discussing
the "action readiness" aspect of emotion).
370. See MARCUS, supra note 13, at 70-71.
371. See Margaret S. Clark & Ian Brissette, Two Types of Relationship Closeness and
Their Influence on People's Emotional Lives, in HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE SCIENCES, supra
note 6, at 824, 831-32.
372. See Bruce E. Kaufman, Emotional Arousal as a Source of Bounded Rationality, 38
J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 135, 136 (1999) ("[Elmotions are a central part of the psychologi-
cal process of motivation (i.e., the process that activates and guides human behavior to-
ward particular ends) as they heighten the saliency of certain desires, wants, and out-
comes and thus energize people to pursue them.").
373. Welch, supra note 330, at 67-68.
374. KRISTEN RENWICK MONROE, THE HEART OF ALTRUISM 234 (1996) (concluding that
"[a]ltruistic behavior does not arise from the dominance of reason over the baser pas-
sions"); see MARCUS, supra note 13, at 21.
375. See Welch, supra note 330, at 69.
376. Dacher Keltner et al., Emotional Intuitions and Moral Play, 19 SOC. JUST. RES.
208, 210 (2006).
377. See PASSIONATE POLITICS, supra note 14, at 18-20.
378. Id. at 21-22; James M. Jasper, The Emotions of Protest: Affective and Reactive
Emotions in and Around Social Movements, 13 SOC. FORUM 397, 415 (1998).
379. Kathryn R. Abrams & Hila Keren, Law in the Cultivation of Hope, 97 CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming Mar. 2009) (manuscript at 5, on file with author).
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the transformation of long-held commitments. 380 Conversely, in
the absence of hope, imagination becomes impossible. Not surpri-
singly, then, dictatorial and oppressive legal regimes often em-
ploy significant resources to eliminate hope within a population
as a means for maintaining power.
The link between emotion and action also plays a critical role
in shifting strategy and tactics within constitutional culture. For
example, the social mobilization and activism that followed the
Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick38 1-and led to
its overruling sixteen years later 382-can be explained, in part, as
a shift from an emotional discourse within the gay community
that centered around shame to one focused on pride.383
D. Emotion and Imagination
Just as emotions enable commitment to take hold, they also
enable individuals to look at their commitments with new and
more discerning eyes. Through attention, appraisal, and assess-
ment; anxiety; and action tendencies, emotions steer the imagina-
tive process and fuel the action necessary to revise prior commit-
ments and imagine new ones.
V. EMOTION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE
For too long, the dominant view has impaired our ability to test
core assumptions about human behavior that informed America's
constitutional design. The result has been a disconnect between a
theoretical framework that views emotion as destructive to con-
stitutional governance and the actual social practice of constitu-
tionalism, where emotion advances core constitutional objectives
of consistency and innovation. Now, in light of recent develop-
ments in affective science and political psychology, we are in a
position to draw some conclusions about the actual role emotion
plays within constitutional culture, and to tighten the link be-
tween theory and practice.
380. Id.
381. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
382. Deborah Gould, Rock the Boat, Don't Rock the Boat, Baby: Ambivalence and the
Emergence of Militant AIDS Activism, in PASSIONATE POLITICS, supra note 14, at 135-36.
383. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
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First, emotion is an unavoidable force in constitutional law-
making-it is simply too central to commitment making, inter-
pretation, moral judgment, and attitude change to be systemati-
cally dismissed or ignored. If the subject matter of recent
Harvard Law Review forewords are any indication, the central
descriptive inquiry in contemporary constitutional theory is the
relationship between "popular conceptions of constitutional law"
and the Court.384 Emotion is a vital part of this developing story,
particularly in an environment where low levels of political know-
ledge and interest inhibit meaningful cognitive input. Indeed,
emotional responses may more accurately predict popular inter-
pretive preferences than indicia of public support for reason-
based arguments.
Second, contrary to the dominant view, emotion can play a pos-
itive role in constitutional culture. This is not to say that emo-
tion's impact is always positive. 385 Indeed, constitutional systems
can and do serve to minimize emotion's capacity to distort deci-
sion making in ways that undermine constitutional values. But
emotional influences aren't entirely negative, and emotion
enables behavior that allows constitutional commitments to de-
velop, thrive, and evolve. As a result, theorists should question
their tendency to discount automatically emotional perspectives
within constitutional debate. Among other things, emotions con-
tain important information about larger value commitments and
serve as a mechanism for preserving those value commitments in
a dynamic and changing environment.
Third, emotion performs a valuable stabilizing function within
constitutional culture. Its connection to habitual behavior allows
written commitments to manifest themselves in social practices,
and its relationship to partisanship helps to create stable political
alignments that allow for a measure of predictability within a
large and diverse political system. Emotion is also critical to the
maintenance of communal structures-like families-that are in-
strumental in reinforcing commitments across generations.
Fourth, emotion enables constitutional innovation and change.
It helps spur social movement action, facilitate individuals' abili-
384. See Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Foreword: A Political
Court, 119 HARv. L. REV. 31, 32-35 (2005); Post, supra note 35, at 4-6, 8-9; Schauer, su-
pra note 230, at 5-8.
385. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
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ty to prioritize among competing concerns, provide important in-
formation as they assess alternative options, and-through anxie-
ty-allows them to break from existing habits.
Fifth, developments in affective science have the potential to
advance ongoing descriptive and normative inquiries in constitu-
tional theory. This article's goal is fairly modest: to demonstrate
the centrality of emotion to core behaviors within constitutional
systems and to argue that emotion brings positive elements to
constitutional culture.
But the impact of these realizations is potentially much larger.
In a number of areas, a revised conception of emotion may alter
the way people think about constitutional law and theory.
A. Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Supremacy
Over the past several years, constitutional scholars have once
again questioned whether constitutional interpretation is the ex-
clusive province of the judiciary and the extent to which interpre-
tation by ordinary citizens, or their elected representatives, is de-
sirable.386 In this debate over interpretive supremacy, a
professionally trained judiciary has always had predictability and
stability on its side, particularly when contrasted with an emo-
tional public. 38 7 The overriding concern is that citizens' reliance
on emotion can lead to interpretive choices that are either erratic
or discount long-term constitutional values to satisfy short-term
desires.
On one level, this characterization is correct. Citizens are likely
to place great reliance upon emotion and intuition in their efforts
to figure out what the Constitution means. And because they may
not have a lot of information about the Constitution to work with,
they will likely rely on emotion and intuition to compensate.
But citizens' reliance on emotion may actually enhance their
interpretive capacity. Emotion will help stabilize interpretation
over time by integrating preferences into habit and by providing a
mechanism for implanting those values across generations. More-
386. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 101; MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION
AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
387. See Michael J. Klarman, What's So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 Nw. U. L.
REV. 145, 152-53 (1999).
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over, it is only under certain emotional contexts that citizens'
more rational faculties take hold and cause them to revisit past
commitments and assumptions.
In addition, the emotional attachment to the Constitution as a
symbol, like the Bible, will temper more extreme interpretations
of constitutional meaning. While many Americans remain ill-
informed about the Constitution's specific content, they have an
emotional bond with the document that sustains its legitimacy
and lasting integrity. These symbolic emotional ties may help ex-
plain why, for example, so many Americans oppose same-sex
marriage but are reluctant to support a formal amendment that
would elevate their policy preferences into a national precom-
mitment. 388
As a result, if the primary concern behind the capacity of ordi-
nary citizens to make constitutional judgments is their suscepti-
bility to the erratic and immediate pull of emotional forces, that
danger may be far less extreme than the dominant view suggests.
Indeed, if emotion helps stabilize popular interpretive prefe-
rences, members of the public may have a far greater capacity for
interpretive consistency than previously believed.
B. The Court and Public Opinion
Along with potentially enhancing interpretive capacity, emo-
tion may also operate as a limitation on the Court's influence over
the public. Constitutional scholars have long been skeptical of the
Court's ability to initiate meaningful social change. 389 Some of
the research on the sources of attitudes and the causes of attitude
change helps explain why.
Most notably, the basis for a particular attitude impacts an in-
dividual's capacity for attitude change. Affect-based attitudes-
attitudes formed when affective reaction precedes conscious
thought-are more susceptible to persuasive efforts that appeal
388. See Patrick J. Egan, Nathaniel Persily & Kevin Wallsten, Gay Rights, in PUBLIC
OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 234, 255 (Nathaniel Persily, Jack Citrin &
Patrick J. Egan eds., 2008) (summarizing public opinion data to conclude that "support for
a constitutional amendment [banning same-sex marriage] is consistently lower than oppo-
sition to legalization of same-sex marriage.").
389. See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 1991).
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to emotion rather than cognitive capacities. 390 Further, affect-
based attitudes are held with greater confidence than attitudes
based in cognition. 39 1
This suggests that the very nature of legal reasoning may inhi-
bit the Court's ability to engage public opinion in ways that mat-
ter. If large swaths of the public engage in constitutional dis-
course from an emotional perspective, the Court's reason-based
interpretive methodology is unlikely to impact popular attitudes
about constitutional law.392 This presents a critical challenge to
those who see the Court as educating the public,393 as well as to
those who envision the Court as engaged in active dialogue and
negotiation with the American people. 394
It also suggests that there may be benefits to greater emotional
transparency in judicial opinions. If the public speaks a language
that responds to emotional content more strongly than analytical
reasoning, the presence of emotional appeals in judicial decisions
may enhance public support for the Court's actions.
C. Constitutional Amendment
Another area for inquiry is the continued normative effort to
define the optimal level of constitutional tension between com-
mitment and imagination. Article V has taken its share of lumps
from constitutional scholars for the difficulty it places on formally
amending the Constitution through its supermajority require-
ments at both the proposal and ratification stages. 395 At present,
390. Edwards, supra note 253, at 211; FISKE supra note 233, at 225-31.
391. Edwards, supra note 253, at 212; see also Haddock & Zanna, supra note 259, at
337 (individuals whose attitudes were "affect-consistent" on other topics relied more on
their emotional reactions to the topic in forming their attitudes).
392. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an Educative Institution?, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 961, 1030 (1992) (arguing that "if the Court is to communicate effectively
with the people, it must somehow bring its interpretation of the Constitution to the level
of the people").
393. See Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 208 (1952) (describing members of the Court as "teachers in a vital national se-
minar").
394. See Post, supra note 35, at 104 (describing the Court's decision in Lawrence v.
Texas as an "opening bid in a conversation that the Court expects to hold with the Ameri-
can public").
395. See, e.g., Stephen M. Griffin, The Nominee Is ... Article V, in CONSTITUTIONAL
STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES, supra note 32, at 51, 51-53: LEVINSON, supra
note 131, at 159-66.
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Article V sets a threshold for amendment that is significantly
higher than virtually any other constitution currently in exis-
tence. 396
If the intent behind the high threshold is to minimize the de-
structive impact of emotion on constitutional lawmaking-as the
framers' theory of human behavior suggests-the underlying con-
cerns behind their intent seem increasingly misguided. In a world
where reason and emotion coexist in decision making, where emo-
tion operates as a stabilizing force in constitutional culture, and
where emotion carries with it important information about moral
intuition and public values, there may be good reason to allow or-
dinary people greater access to the mechanisms for formal consti-
tutional change. If emotion can stabilize attitudes towards consti-
tutionally salient issues, a more permissive amendment process
may be less unpredictable, unruly, and unreliable than the fra-
mers believed.
D. Institutional Design
Constitutional theorists have been actively searching for a set
of conditions that would best facilitate sound public decision mak-
ing. These solutions have typically centered around mechanistic,
deliberative structures, like Bruce Ackerman's proposal to set
aside a "Deliberation Day" to enable higher-quality public partic-
ipation in political life.397 Emotion research has the potential to
impact these solutions, suggesting that greater attention should
be paid to the optimal emotional context for public decision mak-
ing or the cultivation of particular emotions when making deci-
sions, rather than a continued focus on increased deliberation and
the cultivation of cognitive reasoning processes.
For example, intolerance is tied to perceptions that members of
a given group present a threat. When individuals hold strong in-
tolerant attitudes-attitudes deemed particularly dangerous to
the future of heterogeneous democratic societies-those attitudes
are more likely to shift under persuasive methods that provide
emotional reassurance against the threat, rather than under the
cognitive acquisition of facts suggesting that the target of the in-
396. LEVINSON, supra note 131, at 160.
397. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY 3-4 (2004).
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tolerant attitude does not present a realistic threat.398 If citizens
view intolerance as damaging to constitutional systems, it may be
wise to focus reform efforts on developing democratic institutions
that provide this emotional reassurance rather than deliberative
processes that implicitly denigrate emotion and idealize reasoned
argument and logical inference.
VI. CONCLUSION
Constitutional theory is behind. While theorists in economics,
psychology, and biology use new realizations about human beha-
vior to challenge long-held theoretical assumptions, 399 constitu-
tional theory has remained largely stagnant in its efforts to
match theory to developing understandings of human behavior.
The dominant view's continued prevalence within constitutional
theory has obscured America's ability to see how emotion ad-
vances constitutional objectives, and America has failed to design
institutions that could exploit emotion's positive effects and ad-
vance those objectives even further.
Despite American's current failure, we can do better. The cen-
tral task for the next generation of constitutional theorists is to
make constitutional theory relevant by aligning it with what we
know about human and institutional behavior. This requires de-
veloping new areas of expertise, collaborating across disciplines,
and letting go of broad generalizations about human behavior
that have defined the course of constitutional theory for several
generations of scholars. Theory-on either a descriptive or nor-
mative plane-must stay tied to practice to maintain its relev-
ance. As affective science begins to revolutionize the way we
think about human behavior, it is incumbent upon constitutional
theory to realign and respond.
398. See Kuklinski et al., supra note 111, at 233-45; MARCUS ET AL., supra note 68, at
3.
399. See DAMASIO, supra note 11, at xi-xii; ELSTER, supra note 50, at 1-2; Loewen-
stein, supra note 156, at 272, 276.
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